A tale of two wards: political participation and the urban poor in Dhaka city

Abstract

This paper investigates the extent of political participation of the urban poor in Dhaka, identifying the actors with whom the urban poor interact for problem solving and gaining access to services. Through a comparison of the different experiences of "active" and "non-active" poor residents across two wards, the research identifi es barriers to effective political participation; it then considers how opportunities for participation can be advanced. The experience of the Coalition for the Urban Poor's (CUP) Basti Basheer Odhikar Surakha Committee (BOSC) illustrates how collective mobilization of the poor has been successful in incorporating the urban poor into municipal governance. However, alongside its successes, the research investigates constraints to such initiatives in terms of securing national commitment to urban poverty reduction.

Urban Poverty in Bangladesh: Causes, Consequences and Coping Strategies

“…Bustee residents are still unlikely to send their children to school, however. NGO programmes have been subject to criticisms from bustee residents in Dhaka for not meeting their needs and priorities, by focusing on issues such as health education over the provision of basic services and infrastructure (Banks 2008;Joshi et al 2011). In reality, Joshi et al (2011) find, a lack of toilets and sanitary facilities in bustees is not a result of low demand or limited health and hygiene knowledge, and such an approach exacerbates existing inequalities and indignities.…”

“…The urban poor's exclusion from services and infrastructure goes beyond physical availability, and extends to political, institutional and economic factors (Akbar et al 2007). These include laws prohibiting service providers from delivering services to households lacking a land holding number, 71 NGOs' unwillingness to invest in bustees under threat of eviction, poor coordination among government departments and service providers, and institutional incapacity, with urban local governments having an unrealistic set of functions within tight funding constraints (Matin 1999;Akbar et al 2007;Banks 2008;Ghafur 2000).…”

“…In the absence of legal service provision, parallel systems of informal provision are mediated and controlled by powerful unelected local leaders and mastaans (or 'musclemen') (Banks 2008). Drawing on their political affiliation, powerful businessmen in the bustee tap into water supplies and negotiate with water officials to ensure ongoing supplies, 74 distributing these services at high prices to busteebashees, in the process creating a multi-tiered system of dependency (Baumgart et al 2011;.…”

“…93 While municipal governments are best-placed to address urban poverty, central government is reluctant to hand over power and resources to a democratically elected government, for fear of its capture by the opposition. This greatly constrains the powers, functions, jurisdictions and financial capacities at the municipal level (Banks 2008;Banks 2011b). A lack of commitment to urban poverty at the national level is therefore intensified through a cacophony of problems at the municipal level, 94 including under-funded and overstretched municipal governments that lack accountability and responsiveness to the urban poor, particularly given that they lack a mandate for urban poverty reduction.…”

Slum types and adaptation strategies: identifying policy-relevant differences in Bangalore

“…non-institutional means of gaining information and access were used by more than 95 per cent. studying slum communities in Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, Banks found, similarly, how social networks can matter more than level of education; see Banks, nicola (2008), "A tale of two wards: political participation and the urban poor in Dhaka city", Environment and Urbanization Vol 20, no 2, pages 361-376.…”