A Tale of Two Mayors: Courts and Politics in Iran and Turkey

Abstract

Countries such as Iran and Turkey do not fit comfortably into the democratic and authoritarian categories. In these countries, elections are held regularly, and the will of the people is accepted as one source of sovereignty. At the same time, both constitutionally and in practice the elected officials have to share the exercise of political power with institutions that do not draw their power directly from the will of the people. In such systems, the judiciary has two important political functions. First, the judiciary acts as a politically insulated decision-maker through which the unelected head can exercise some degree of control over the actions of the elected head. Second, the judiciary's direct involvement in the political arena increases political tensions and legitimates the continuation of the two-headed system. In systems based on divided sovereignty, the tensions created by the judicialization of politics contribute to the stability of the regime.

Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case

“…In essence, the Turkish regime can be defined as combining electoral democracy with guardianship, which entails that a group of elites governs by reason of its unique knowledge, wisdom, and virtue (Dahl 1989:52). In Turkey, the high judiciary, which is insulated from the influence of political parties and allied with the military, claims the ultimate guardianship role (Shambayati 2004;Tezcür 2007). The Constitutional Court, established after the 1961 coup, structures the boundaries of the legitimate political domain by banning political parties (Kogacioglu 2004).…”

Erdoğan’s pragmatism and the ascension of AKP in Turkey: Islam and neo‐Ottomanism

“…This sequence of pressures and events led to the dissolution of the RP by the Constitutional Court in 1998. On December 6, 1997, at a rally in the southeastern province of Siirt facing a conservative audience, Erdoğan criticized Turkey's strict secularism and the restrictions placed on public displays of religious sentiments (Shambayati, 2004). At one point, Erdoğan quoted a poem by Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) with the verses: “Minarets are bayonets, domes are helmets; mosques are our barracks, and the believers are soldiers” (Erdoğan, as cited in Shambayati, 2004).…”

“…312, 1929). In April 1998, Erdoğan was found guilty, receiving a ten‐month sentence, and would thereafter lose his political rights (Shambayati, 2004). The decision was met with protests by Erdoğan supporters.…”

Courts and New Democracies: Recent Works

“…Some accounts of Chile's negotiated transition under Pinochet fit this account, in that property rights and an institutional veto for the departing autocrats were entrenched into the constitution (but see further discussion below). Turkey's military‐drafted 1982 Constitution seemed to contemplate a similar role for courts, which served to discipline Islamist political parties for many years (Shambayati 2004, 2007; Bâli 2012). The strategy of using courts to entrench policies is effective in a wide variety of settings, but there is also no guarantee that it will be fully effective, particularly if courts are tainted as instruments of the earlier regime.…”