2016
DOI: 10.1177/1748006x16682606
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A systems approach to risk analysis of maritime operations

Abstract: Technological innovations and new areas of application introduce new challenges related to safety and control of risk in the maritime industry. Dynamic-positioning systems (DP systems) are increasingly used, contributing to a higher level of autonomy and complexity aboard maritime vessels. Currently, risk assessment and verification of DP systems are focused on technical reliability, and the main effort is centered on design and demonstration of redundancy in order to protect against component failures. In thi… Show more

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Cited by 45 publications
(50 citation statements)
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“…The design issues would often be overlooked unsafe system states (hazards) that involve various interactions, not least the interactions between technology and people, e.g. (Rokseth et al, 2017). New hazard analysis methods, which are not yet imbedded in the current requirements, could be considered for more comprehensive analysis.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The design issues would often be overlooked unsafe system states (hazards) that involve various interactions, not least the interactions between technology and people, e.g. (Rokseth et al, 2017). New hazard analysis methods, which are not yet imbedded in the current requirements, could be considered for more comprehensive analysis.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rokseth et al applied the STPA method to hazard analysis of marine operations, particularly the operations of offshore supply 94 vessels using the DP system (Rokseth et al, 2017). The authors analysed the following system and sub-system level hazards: 95 vessel motion is not controlled according to the motion-control objectives, the motion-control objectives are not in line with 96 the operational function of the vessel, thrusters are not controlled in a manner that satisfies the control objectives, adequate 97 amount of power is unavailable for thrusters.…”
Section: Dong Et Al Studied Collision Incidents and Accidents Betweementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gerek adım 5 tespit edilen hata bazlı risk değerleri ve gerekse de adım 6'da tespit edilen global risk değerleri denklem (26) 10 (1) 0.14 puanla en yüksek tercih edilirlik değerine sahiptir. RKS 10 'u 0.09 puanla RKS 4 (2) takip etmektedir.…”
Section: Adım 7 Risk/emniyet Değerlerinin Durulaştırılmasıunclassified