A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues in Contact Tracing Application of Covid-19

Abstract

In response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, Government and public health authorities around the world are developing contact tracing apps as a way to trace and slow the unfold of the virus. There is major divergence among nations, however, between a "privacy-first" approach that protects citizens' information at the price of very restricted access for public health authorities and a "data-first" approach that stores massive amounts of knowledge that, whereas of immeasurable price to epidemiologists. Contact tracing apps work by gathering information from people who have tested positive for the virus and so locating and notifying individuals with whom those people are in shut contact, oftentimes by use of GPS, Bluetooth, or wireless technology. All of the user's information is employed and picked up, the study found that users' information would be created anonymous, encrypted, secured, and can be transmitted on-line and stored solely in an aggregated format. Contact tracing apps use either a centralized or a decentralized approach to work the user's information. Apps that use a centralized approach have high privacy risks. In this paper, the researcher's contributions related to the security and privacy of Contact tracing apps have been discussed and, later research gaps have been identified with proposed solutions.

Implementing Public Health Strategies—The Need for Educational Initiatives: A Systematic Review

“…Emerging evidence from some EU countries, most affected by the current pandemic, suggests that they use aggregated call detail records (CDRs) to carry out their stay-at-home policies and implementation of lockdowns [4,6,24,51]. In addition, there are other valid ethical concerns regarding the use of contact tracing apps within the EU, challenging its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).…”

“…However, the inadequate level of public compliance with these public health strategies has resulted in mandatory contact tracing strategies as part of a government strategy in some countries [8,17,21]. Within the European Union (EU), in some nations, authorities together with telecommunications providers started sharing people's anonymous location data on map concentrations, respecting the Europe's privacy laws and individuals' rights to privacy [8,9,[21][22][23][24][25][26][27].…”

Privacy Preservation of User Identity in Contact Tracing for COVID-19-Like Pandemics Using Edge Computing

“…Content may change prior to final publication. developed applications [45]. Tawakkalna [46], TraceTogether [47], CovidSafe [48], among many others [45], use a centralized architecture.…”

“…developed applications [45]. Tawakkalna [46], TraceTogether [47], CovidSafe [48], among many others [45], use a centralized architecture. However, this type of architecture has a single point of failure and faces privacy issues, as central servers are able to link users' identities and their contact tracing regardless of infection [7,45].…”

“…Tawakkalna [46], TraceTogether [47], CovidSafe [48], among many others [45], use a centralized architecture. However, this type of architecture has a single point of failure and faces privacy issues, as central servers are able to link users' identities and their contact tracing regardless of infection [7,45]. In contrast, a decentralized architecture enables users to participate in contact tracing without registering on central servers; this ensures the privacy of their identities.…”