A survey of stackelberg differential game models in supply and marketing channels

He, Xiuli; Prasad, Ashutosh; Sethi, Suresh P.; Gutiérrez, Genaro J.

doi:10.1007/s11518-008-5082-x

Cited by 36 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…He et al [13] surveyed recent applications of leaderfollower (Stackelberg) differential game models in supply chains (marketing channels).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The two equations in (13) are equivalent because q = α − p in the optimal solutions of the supply chain and retailer problems, respectively. For instance, solving each equation with respect to w 1 provides two identical solutions.…”

Section: Manufacturer's Problem: Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With a fixed revenue share φ 1 (t), the wholesale price w 1 (t) is determined as a function of φ 1 (t) and t by any of the two equations in (13). The first line in (13) shows that coordination is achieved if the manufacturer proposes φ 1 (t) = 1 and w 1 (t) = a, i.e, a two-part tariff with transfer payment π(t) = aq(t) + F (t).…”

Section: Revenue Share Givenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first line in (13) shows that coordination is achieved if the manufacturer proposes φ 1 (t) = 1 and w 1 (t) = a, i.e, a two-part tariff with transfer payment π(t) = aq(t) + F (t). The retailer keeps all revenue and pays a constant wholesale price being equal to the marginal production cost.…”

Section: Revenue Share Givenmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intertemporal Contracting in a Supply Chain

Jørgensen

2011

Dyn Games Appl

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“…He et al [13] surveyed recent applications of leaderfollower (Stackelberg) differential game models in supply chains (marketing channels).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Manufacturer's Problem: Partmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Revenue Share Givenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Revenue Share Givenmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intertemporal Contracting in a Supply Chain

Jørgensen

2011

Dyn Games Appl

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“…(For applications of deterministic differential games in management science and operations research, we refer the interested reader to reviews by Feichtinger and Jorgenson (1983), Kogan and Tapiero (2007) and He et al (2007). ) Due to this mathematical complexity, our paper focuses on a water ordering-production and supply decision problem.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Water supply and consumption uncertainty: a conflict-equilibrium

Kogan

Tapiero

2010

Ann Oper Res

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This paper addresses the economic efficiency of water production and distribution in a vertical supply chain consisting of a water-provider and a consumer (municipality). The inherent conflicts over stocks and supply costs that emerge among the parties in the water supply chain are modeled as a zero-sum stochastic differential game. Consequently, the effects of collaboration and competition are contrasted as well as the application of block pricing and subsidies in overcoming potential conflicts between the water-provider and the municipality subject to political risks of not meeting demands for water. The effect of uncertainty is elaborated as well. In particular, we show that when the supply variance depends on the mean supply, the effect of uncertainty depends on the intensity of the conflict between the municipality and the water-provider.

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A systematical analysis on the dynamic pricing strategies and optimization methods for energy trading in smart grids

Alsalloum

Merghem-Boulahia

Rahim

2020

Int Trans Electr Energ Syst

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Summary The smart grid (SG) is an enhancement of the traditional electrical grid. Its main objectives are diverse, focusing mainly on minimizing the energy cost, as well as energy consumption. The smooth integration of renewable energy balances energy production and consumption. Dynamic pricing (DP) becomes one of the important integrated solutions, which comes in line with the global efficiency and reliability of smart grids. DP incentivizes the consumer to participate in the energy scheduling decision, mainly in the real‐time decision. Consumer represents the key challenge in the SG in perspective to make the energy system more efficient. Moreover, the success of smart grids relies mostly on the evolution of the widely used optimization methods. These include measures to encourage consumers and providers to be involved in the development of the SG. The main objective of this article is to review and analyze the recent research works regarding the pricing strategies and optimization methods utilized in the context of SG. A systematic analysis is thus performed by considering twofold views. First, it comprehensively approaches the pricing majors and visualizes the game theory used in real‐time pricing. Second, it describes the optimization methods used in the smart grid context and compares them in terms of their complexity.

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A survey of stackelberg differential game models in supply and marketing channels

Cited by 36 publications

References 0 publications

Intertemporal Contracting in a Supply Chain

Intertemporal Contracting in a Supply Chain

Water supply and consumption uncertainty: a conflict-equilibrium

A systematical analysis on the dynamic pricing strategies and optimization methods for energy trading in smart grids

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