A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems

Kriaa, Siwar; Piètre-Cambacédès, Ludovic; Bouissou, Marc; Halgand, Yoran

doi:10.1016/j.ress.2015.02.008

Cited by 287 publications

(199 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Traditional industries were based on mechanical devices and closed systems (Kriaa et al, 2015). Only safety related risks generated from accidental component failures and human errors need to be addressed during risk analysis of these industries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Likelihood analysis aims to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of risk scenarios. This estimate can be qualitative or quantitative depending on the available data.Traditional industries were based on mechanical devices and closed systems (Kriaa et al, 2015). Only safety related risks generated from accidental component failures and human errors need to be addressed during risk analysis of these industries.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Johnson (2012); Kornecki and Zalewski (2010)). The differences and similarities between safety and security are studied by many authors (Kriaa et al (2015); Firesmith (December 2003)). In general, safety is associated with accidental risks caused by component failures, human errors or any non-deliberate source of hazard, while security is related to deliberate risks originating from malicious attacks which can be accomplished physically (which are excluded in this study) or by cyber means.…”

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confidence: 99%

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A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie – combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis

Abdo

Kaouk

Flaus

et al. 2018

Computers & Security

134

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To cite this version:H Abdo, M. Kaouk, J-M. Flaus, F. Masse. A safety/security risk analysis approach of industrial control systems: a cyber bowtie -combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis. Computers Security, 2017, 72, pp.175-195 AbstractThe introduction of connected systems and digital technology in process industries creates new cyber-security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by sophisticated threats and lead to undesirable safety accidents. Thus, identifying these vulnerabilities during risk analysis becomes an important part for effective industrial risk evaluation. However, nowadays, safety and securityare analyzed separately when they should not be. This is because a security threat can lead to the same dangerous phenomenon as a safety incident. In this paper, a new method that considers safety and security together during industrial risk analysis is proposed. This approach combines bowtie analysis, commonly used for safety analysis, with a new extended version of attack tree analysis, introduced for security analysis of industrial control systems. The combined use of bowtie and attack tree provides an exhaustive representation of risk scenarios in terms of safety and security. We then propose an approach for evaluating the risk level based on two-term likelihood parts, one for safety and one for security. The application of this approach is demonstrated using the case study of a risk scenario in a chemical facility.Keywords: Risk analysis, safety, cyber-security, bowtie analysis, Attack-Tree analysis, SCADA. INTRODUCTIONAnalyzing risks of industrial and complex systems such as those found in nuclear plants, chemical factories, etc., is of crucial importance given the hazards linked to these systems (explosion, dispersion, etc.) (Abdo and Flaus, 2016b). Quantifying and analyzing these major risks contributes to better decision making and ensures that risks are managed according to defined acceptance criteria (Arunraj and Maiti, 2007).Industrial safety risk analysis aims to evaluate undesirable risk scenarios that can lead to major accidents that affect human and the environment. Traditionally, a systematic risk analysis process is made up of three steps: (i) identification of risk scenarios, (ii) likelihood analysis, (iii) effect analysis (Purdy, 2010). Based on these steps, a level of risk will be given to each scenario to see if it is acceptable or not. If not, safety measures should be added to reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level by diminishing the likelihood or the effects. This work considers the first two steps. Identifying a risk scenario aims to explore how an undesirable hazard can be developed starting from causes and ending with the consequences. Likelihood analysis aims to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of risk scenarios. This estimate can be qualitative or quantitative depending on the available data.Traditional industries were based on mechanical devices and closed systems (Kriaa et al., 2015). Only safety related risks generated from accidental com...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie – combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis

Abdo

Kaouk

Flaus

et al. 2018

Computers & Security

134

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“…Thus it becomes important to consider safety and security of ICS in an integrated framework. Therefore, a number of researchers suggest that it is necessary to combine security and safety requirements (Bloomfield et al 2013;Kriaa et al 2015;Novak et al 2007). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Model-based Approach to Interdependency between Safety and Security in ICS

Hankin

2015

Electronic Workshops in Computing

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Wide use of modern ICT technologies brings not only communication efficiency, but also security vulnerabilities into industrial control systems. Traditional physically-isolated systems are now required to take cyber security into consideration, which might also lead to system failures. However, integrating security and safety analysis has always been a challenging issue and the various interdependencies between them make it even more difficult, because they might mutually enhance, or undermine. The paper proposes an integrating framework to (i) formalise the desired and undesired properties to be safe(unsafe) or secure(insecure), including the dependencies between them, (ii) evaluate if a query state reaches a safe(unsafe) or secure(insecure) state, and further quantify how safe or secure the state is. In this way, we can accurately capture the benign and harmful relations between safety and security, particularly detecting and measuring conflicting impacts on them. Finally, this framework is implemented by answer set programming to enable automatic evaluation, which is demonstrated by a case study on pipeline transportation.

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“…In Chinese, the same word is used for these two terms. The biggest similarity between security and safety lies that both of them deal with risks and hence some approaches in one field may be applicable to the other [5]. However, there are substantial differences between security and safety.…”

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confidence: 99%

Analysis of security in cyber-physical systems

Chen

Zhang

Sun

2017

Sci. China Technol. Sci.

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In recent years, cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have received much attention from both the academic world and the industrial world, which refer to a deep integration and coordination of physical and computational resources [1,2]. Typical examples of CPSs can be found in smart grids, smart transportation systems, industrial control systems, water supply systems, and so on. Furthermore, many military systems are also CPSs. The key characteristic of CPSs is the integration of computing, control and communication. The increased interconnection between the cyber and physical spaces make CPSs vulnerable to various malicious attacks. A well-known example of an attack of CPSs is the Stuxnet which infected the control system of nuclear-fuel centrifuges of Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. Stuxnet makes people beware of the grave consequences of a cyber-attack on a CPS. Since many national critical infrastructures are applications of CPS, ensuring security and safety of such systems is of great importance.In traditional information technology (IT) systems, three security objectives are confidentiality, integrity and availability, where confidentiality is in the first place. While in CPSs, availability ranks the first. Besides, there are some differences between IT systems and CPSs. For examples, in CPSs, a long-term safe and reliable operation is necessary. In CPSs, components are rarely replaced and difficult to upgrade. In CPSs, the control performance of the system should be taken into account. The traditional IT security methods such as data encryption and authentication can protect the confidentiality of data and keep from unauthorized access to some extent

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A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems

Cited by 287 publications

References 52 publications

A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie – combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis

A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie – combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis

A Model-based Approach to Interdependency between Safety and Security in ICS

Analysis of security in cyber-physical systems

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