A Surprising Result Encountered in Various Extensions of the Traditional Deterrence Game

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to present a surprising result regarding crisis initiation and termination. The decision problem treated here is distilled from an extension of the two-sided incomplete information version of the traditional deterrence game. We employ a two-stage analysis of the decision problem faced by the Challenger that formally links the onset of a crisis to the decision over whether to escalate the crisis should the Challenger face resistance from the Defender. The two-part result is as follows. A crisis is more likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately back down if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to escalate if Defender chooses to resist. Contrariwise, a crisis is less likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately escalate if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to back down if Defender chooses to resist.