A supranational regime that nationalizes social conflict: Explaining European trade unions' difficulties in politicizing European economic governance

Abstract

Until very recently, European employers and political leaders denied the need for any coordination in industrial relations at EU level. In 2011 however, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a new European economic governance regime that makes EU member states' labor policies subject to multilateral surveillance procedures. This paper analyzes this 'silent revolution' from above and assesses organized labor's responses to this challenge. It shows that the EU's new governance regime does not follow the classical model of a federal state, but rather the governance structures of multinational corporations that control their local subsidiaries through the use of whipsawing tactics and coercive comparisons. European trade unions' and social movements' difficulties in politicizing European economic governance are thus best explained by the ability of the new supranational EU regime to nationalize social conflicts.

Economic Integration and State Responses: Change in European Industrial Relations since Maastricht

“…Labour mobility, despite being inherently lower than capital mobility, raised questions over the state's control over a territory and therefore the idea of national models (Ferrera 2005), and the future of national regulations such as collective bargaining and the right of strike (Dølvik and Visser 2011). European Court of Justice rulings, the EU enlargement (Crespy and Menz 2015;Meardi 2012) and the imposition of 'structural reforms' in crisis countries (Erne 2015;Meardi 2014a) appeared to confirm earlier criticisms of the EU's role in IR and welfare states as 'negative' and 'market-making', rather than 'positive' and 'market-correcting' (Streeck 1995). In this situation, the national models which were so visible in the 1990s to the then prolific comparative IR literature quickly started to be seen as 'in flux' (Bosch et al 2009), 'in crisis' (Dølvik and Martin 2014) or even 'failed ideas' (Lehndorff 2012).…”

“…Robustness checks show that varying the weight does not change the overall picture significantly, that is, the relative position of countries in the scatter chart does not change. One sensitive variable is 'support to actors' through social pacts and tripartite commissions: if removed, on the grounds that some analysts (Erne 2008;Ost 2000) see these as merely illusory phenomena, Italy's degree of state regulation falls below that of Germany. Yet, the Italian case is exactly one where the incidence of social pacts (but not that of its muted tripartite commission) is stronger, as in the case of agreements strengthening collective bargaining articulation and employee workplace representation in 1993 or improving welfare benefits in 2007.…”

“…In the European Union (EU) even more than elsewhere, transnational pressures on the three main actors of IR (state, capital, labour) have driven significant changes, raising questions on the capacity of national IR institutions to survive. Important recent accounts contrast with Crouch's one sharply, by identifying a neoliberal convergent trajectory (Baccaro and Howell 2017), preferring transnational levels of analysis (Erne 2008) or indicating the weakening of national wage bargaining institutions (Visser 2013). As units for comparative analysis, economic sectors have gained more importance besides, or even in replacement of, countries (Bechter et al 2012;Katz and Darbishire 2000).…”

Austerity stabilised through European funds: the impact on Slovenian welfare administration and provision

“…This move also entailed a multilevel, multidimensional and multistakeholder coordination, which poses significant challenges to administration and provision of welfare as it requires new capacities in the form of sufficient financial and staff resources, differentiated and flexible procedures and new professional norms (Heidenreich and Rice, ). These pressures and challenges have further intensified after the global economic crisis that contributed to even stricter economic and budgetary surveillance and fiscal discipline of member states, accompanied by even tighter workfarist social policy prescriptions supported by European funds (Erne, ; Heyes, ; Heyes and Lewis, ).…”

Zwei Gesichter der Euro-Austerität. Die Eurokrise und der Umbau des öffentlichen Sektors in Finnland und Portugal

“…Die unterschiedlichen Formen und Auswirkungen der Euro-Austerität in einzelnen Ländern erklären zum Teil, weshalb es sozialen Kräften wie den Gewerkschaften schwerfällt, europäische Gegenbewegungen zu organisieren (Erne, 2015). Gleichzeitig führen die weiter wachsenden Asymmetrien und Divergenzen zwischen Ländern wie Portugal und Finnland auch vor Augen, dass die austeritätspolitische Krisenbearbeitung weder zur wirtschaftlichen Erholung in der Eurozone noch zur gesteigerten Legitimität des europäischen Projektes in seiner aktuellen neoliberalen Form beigetragen hat.…”