A sum-of-squares approach to GNSS spoofing detection

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are being the target of various jamming, spoofing, and meaconing attacks. This paper proposes a new statistical test for the presence of multiple spoofers based on range measurements observed by a plurality of receivers located on a rigid body platform. The relative positions of the receivers are known, but the location and orientation of the platform are unknown. The test is based on the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) paradigm and essentially performs a consistency check between the set of observed range measurements and known information about the satellite topology and the geometry of the receiver constellation. Optimal spoofing locations and optimal artificial time delays (as induced by the spoofers) are also determined. Exact evaluation of the GLRT requires the maximum-likelihood estimates of all parameters, which proves difficult. Instead, approximations based on iterative algorithms and the squared-range least squares algorithm are derived. The accuracy of these approximations is benchmarked against Cramér-Rao lower bounds. Numerical examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and show that increasing the number of GNSS receivers makes the attack easier to detect. We also show that using multiple GNSS receivers limits the availability of optimal attack positions.

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“…• Spoofing detection maybe based on estimated direction-of-arrival of the GNSS signals [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31].…”

Section: Spatial Signal Processing Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, carrier phase differences can be used to estimate this direction of arrival [22,25,27]. • One may exploit that counterfeit signals from a single spoofing source are spatially correlated and measure the spatial correlation between the received signals from different satellites [32][33][34].…”

Section: Spatial Signal Processing Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Kalantari

Larsson

2020

EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process.

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“…This device is suitable for the purpose of our verification methodology, i.e., providing the same signal environment to all GNSS receivers for which the performance is to be evaluated. The simulation or validation test is based on the replay functionality of similar devices, but most are for representing the resilience of their algorithms or devices to increasing GNSS vulnerabilities, such as jamming, spoofing [18][19][20], multipath [21], and interferences.…”

Section: Gnss Signal Recording and Replayingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Performance Evaluation of Various GNSS Receivers and Positioning Modes with Only One Flight Test

et al. 2019

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The performance of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers in dynamic modes is mostly assessed using results obtained from independent maneuvering of vehicles along similar trajectories at different times due to limitations of receivers, payload, space, and power of moving vehicles. However, such assessments do not ensure valid evaluation because the same GNSS signal environment cannot be ensured in a different test session irrespective of how accurately it mimics the original session. In this study, we propose a valid methodology that can evaluate the dynamic performance of multiple GNSS receivers in various positioning modes with only one dynamic test. We used the record-and-replay function of RACELOGIC's LabSat3 Wideband and developed a software that can log and re-broadcast Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) messages for the augmented systems. A preliminary static test and a drone test were performed to verify proper operation of the system. The results show that the system could efficiently evaluate the performances of stand-alone, differential GNSS, and real time kinematics positioning for three GNSS receivers in two different positioning modes by repeatedly re-radiating the recorded signals acquired through only one flight. Our proposed system is expected to be useful in evaluating dynamic navigation performance accurately and conveniently in a valid manner.

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“…Besides these filed demonstrations, the Iran-US RQ-170 incident and the recently reported GPS problem in central Moscow [ 10 ] and the Black Sea [ 11 ], have further intensified the interest in this area. With open source GPS signal simulators available online and the fast developing software-defined radio technology, GNSS spoofing has become “ not only feasible but also affordable ” [ 12 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact Assessment of GNSS Spoofing Attacks on INS/GNSS Integrated Navigation System

Liu

et al. 2018

Sensors

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In the face of emerging Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attacks, there is a need to give a comprehensive analysis on how the inertial navigation system (INS)/GNSS integrated navigation system responds to different kinds of spoofing attacks. A better understanding of the integrated navigation system’s behavior with spoofed GNSS measurements gives us valuable clues to develop effective spoofing defenses. This paper focuses on an impact assessment of GNSS spoofing attacks on the integrated navigation system Kalman filter’s error covariance, innovation sequence and inertial sensor bias estimation. A simple and straightforward measurement-level trajectory spoofing simulation framework is presented, serving as the basis for an impact assessment of both unsynchronized and synchronized spoofing attacks. Recommendations are given for spoofing detection and mitigation based on our findings in the impact assessment process.

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A sum-of-squares approach to GNSS spoofing detection

Cited by 55 publications

References 13 publications

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Statistical test for GNSS spoofing attack detection by using multiple receivers on a rigid body

Dynamic Performance Evaluation of Various GNSS Receivers and Positioning Modes with Only One Flight Test

Impact Assessment of GNSS Spoofing Attacks on INS/GNSS Integrated Navigation System

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