A Study on the Effect of Credit Ratings on M&amp;A Activity

Kim, Seonhyeon; 박사과정, 고려대학교 경영대학; kim, Changki

doi:10.37197/arfr.2020.33.3.2

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The average CAR(−5,1)ad, CAR(−5,3)ad, CAR(−5,5)ad, CAR(−5,1)m, CAR(−5,3)m, and CAR(−5,5)m are 0.0468, 0.0374, 0.0325, 0.566, 0.0513, and 0.0488, respectively, and all are statistically significant at the 1% level. This aligns with recent Korean evidence suggesting the market responds favorably to bidders' M&A announcements [17,45,46]. Notably, the bidders' CARs vary widely, with a difference between the maximum and minimum CARs of approximately 2.…”

Section: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparisonssupporting

confidence: 86%

“…While many studies in the US market have used market models [36,38,39], the market-adjusted model is deemed more suitable for M&A scenarios when firms may engage in multiple M&As during the estimation period [44]. Han and Shin [17], Kim and Jung [45], and Kim and Kim [46] apply these models to the Korean market; moreover, our findings are consistent regardless of the model used. The average CAR(−5,1)ad, CAR(−5,3)ad, CAR(−5,5)ad, CAR(−5,1)m, CAR(−5,3)m, and CAR(−5,5)m are 0.0468, 0.0374, 0.0325, 0.566, 0.0513, and 0.0488, respectively, and all are statistically significant at the 1% level.…”

Section: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparisonssupporting

confidence: 67%

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The Influence of Ownership Concentration on Sustainable Merger and Acquisition Performance: Navigating Principal Conflicts in the Korean Market

Kim,

Jung,

Cho

2024

Sustainability

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This study examines the dynamics of owner behavior, agency costs, and M&A outcomes in the Korean market, aiming to explore how ownership concentration influences conflicts among principal groups and impacts M&A performance. Using empirical data from Korean M&A transactions, we analyze the effects of ownership concentration and cash payment preferences on firm value. Our findings indicate that while ownership concentration can reduce owner–manager conflicts, it heightens principal–principal conflicts, especially with moderate ownership, weak governance, or financial distress. Control-focused owners prefer cash payments, which can lower acquiring firm announcement returns under high ownership concentrations. Effective governance is crucial for fostering responsible decision-making and sustainable practices in M&As. This research underscores the importance of balanced ownership structures and robust governance mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts and promoting sustainable M&A performance.

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Section: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparisonssupporting

confidence: 86%