A Study of Experimental Incentives as an Influence on Enlistment Intention: More is Not Better

Frey, Jr.; Robert, L; Albert, Steffan; Abraham, K Goodstadt; Barry, Eveanna; Alan, President

doi:10.21236/ad0786676

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Some of the other most attractive items provided, again, fate control (#6), educational benefits (#9, #10), and improved retirement benefits (#5, #11). The first two domains were also found to be among the most important in an enlistment incentive survey of civilian youth (Frey, et al, 1974).…”

Section: Differences In Attractiveness Of Incentives As a Function Ofmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The unadjusted means and standard deviations for the entire sampling design (Figure 1) are shown in Appendix D. enlistment incentive (Frey, et al, 1974). Apparently, the prospect of a performance bonus is useful for both attracing men into the service and retaining them in the service.…”

Section: Effects Of Different Methods Of Administration Using Least-mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The major conclusion was that more is also not better for enlistment incentives. To cite just one dramatic example, 27% of the civilian youth would seriously consider enlisting for the $1000 bonus, but only 8% would do so for the $3,000 bonus (Frey et_al_., 1974).…”

Section: Work Completed On Other Subtasks Of Our Research Program Shementioning

confidence: 99%

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Reenlistment Incentives: More is not Better in the Fleet Either

Frey¹,

Lie²,

Barry³

et al. 1974

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Research on individual, interpersonal and group behavior as they relate to organizational functioning and effectiveness, including studies of leadership, management, motivation and group processes, and factors which enhance individual and institutional competence and improve life quality. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS RESEARCH GROUP Robert W. Stephenson, PhD. DirectorDevelopment of taxonomic systems for classifying jobs, computer assisted counseling systems and personnel data bases, assignment and career progression systems, and evaluation of individual and unit training programs. HUMAN PERFORMANCE RESEARCH GROUP Jerrold M. Levine, PhD. DirectorResearch on stress, environmental factors, information and decision processes, human abilities and skill acquisition, and psychobiological mechanisms of behavior. Ilnr 1 assi.fi prl SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of THIS PAGE (When Data Enttnd)REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE ( When Dato Entertdi Unclassified :uBiTv CLASSIFICATION OP THIS PAGE (When Data EntmS)20. strong interest first in "fate control" in one's work, improved retirement benefits, and educational leave. Manpower retention strategies will have to take all three needs into account.[Indassifiprl As part of the present report, we seek to examine the "more is better" assumption in the course of two experiments in which hypothetical single incentives and double incentive packages were presented to personnel in their first term of service in the Navy, who evaluated various incentives in terms of the impact that such changes would have upon their intention to reenlist. An added feature of these studies is that, in the second experiment, the means through which incentives were administered was varied. For some Navy enlisted personnel, the incentives were presented via a mail questionnaire sent directly to the enlisted man from the American Institutes for Research, while for other Navy enlisted personnel, the incentives were presented to the enlisted man by his Navy career counselor. ,and in our questionnaire survey of junior-college students (Korman, et al., 1973) we found continually that respondents ascribe high value to "fatecontrol" in one's vocational life, as well as to traditional tangible incentives such as money, the opportunity for advancement, and health and welfare benefits. Particularly notable in the latter study was the finding in a factor analysis of a preliminary set of experimental enlistment incentives that approximately 48% of the common variance was accounted for by a factor denoting desire for "fate-control" in one's vocational life. In addition, consistent with, our previous discussion, this last study also suggested the possibility that different incentives might hold different values for men from different socio-economic backgrounds. Hence, our analysis of experimental incentives needed to take these findings into consideration.Administrative procedures. As a result of these influences a total of 12 experimental incentives were developed. In Append...

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Section: Differences In Attractiveness Of Incentives As a Function Ofmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Effects Of Different Methods Of Administration Using Least-mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Reenlistment Incentives: More is not Better in the Fleet Either

Frey¹,

Lie²,

Barry³

et al. 1974

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“…The sample was drawn from a population stratified within geographic regions according to age and school status. Race and socioeconomic background data were available for analyses, reported elsewhere (Frey, Glickman, Korman, Goodstadt, & Romanczuk, 1974).…”

Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 99%

More is not better: Two failures of incentive theory.

Korman¹,

Glickman²,

Frey³

1981

Journal of Applied Psychology

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Those who design incentives generally assume that "more is better." To assess potential influence on enlistment in the Navy, two nationwide interview surveys were conducted of representative samples (each n > 850) of civilian males, ages 16-22 years. The first survey employed 17 different incentives; the second employed 15. Responses on a 5-point scale for single incentives and sets of 2 and 3 incentives were compared. Comparisons were also made of incentives differing in magnitude: $1,000 versus $3,000; 2 years versus 4 years of free college after 4 years of service; and 10% versus 25% of base pay for exceptional performance. No significant changes were found in disposition to enlist when either the number or the absolute magnitude of incentives was increased. Possible explanations are discussed.

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