A Study of Customer Preference Transmission for New Energy Vehicles Based on a Signaling Game and Separating Equilibrium

Abstract

Although there are many methods that can be used to obtain customer preferences for new energy vehicles, most studies generally overlook the fact that customer preferences are private information. The purpose of this study is to investigate the transmission mechanism of customer preferences by taking into account situations in which customers lie. Through a signaling game model, this study analyzed the transmission mechanism of customer preference information for the center control touch screen of new energy vehicles based on separation equilibrium. The results show that when inequality (1) remains, such an equilibrium forms: the customers send the real preference signal, the manufacturer then adopts a new sample consistent with the received signal and prices the product accordingly, and, finally, the customers pay for the new NEV. When inequality (2) remains, the following equilibrium forms: customers signal the opposite of their private preference, the manufacturer then adopts a new sample opposite to the received signal, and, finally, customers pay for the new NEV.