A study of cascading failures in real and synthetic power grid topologies

Abstract

Using the linearized DC power flow model, we study cascading failures and their spatial and temporal properties in the US Western Interconnect (USWI) power grid. We also introduce the preferential Degree And Distance Attachment (DADA) model, with similar degree distributions, resistances, and currents to the USWI. We investigate the behavior of both grids resulting from the failure of a single line. We find that the DADA model and the USWI model react very similarly to that failure, and that their blackout characteristics resemble each other. In many cases, the failure of a single line can cause cascading failures, which impact the entire grid. We characterize the resilience of the grid by three parameters, the most important of which is tolerance α, which is the ratio of the maximal load a line can carry to its initial load. We characterize a blackout by its yield, which we define as the ratio of the final to the initial consumed currents. We find that if α ≥ 2, the probability of a large blackout occurring is very small. By contrast, in a broad range of 1 < α < 2, the initial failure of a single line can result, with a high probability, in cascading failures leading to a massive blackout with final yield less than 80%. The yield has a bimodal distribution typical of a first-order transition, i.e., the failure of a randomly selected line leads either to an insignificant current reduction or to a major blackout. We find that there is a latent period in the development of major blackouts during which few lines are overloaded, and the yield remains high.The duration of this latent period is proportional to the tolerance. The existence of the latent period suggests that intervention during early time steps of a cascade can significantly reduce the risk of a major blackout.

Limits of Predictability of Cascading Overload Failures in Spatially-Embedded Networks with Distributed Flows

“…2(a),(b), with data points condensed around two regions: either causing severe damage of G ∈ [0.3; 0.6] or inducing no cascading failure. Similar bimodal behavior has been reported for cascading failures in the US Western Interconnect (USWI) power grid [19].…”

“…Prior studies on cascading failures in power grids suggest that power grid blackouts follow a first-order phase transition [18]. Similarly, a recent study conducted on the US Western Interconnect power grid has revealed that the probability of cascading failures occurring, with respect to the value of the tolerance parameter, exhibits a bimodal nature, characteristic to first-order transitions [19]. These results indicate that a disruption in the system can either cause insignificant damage or trigger severe cascading failures.…”

“…We also employ Random Geometric Graphs (RGGs) [28,29] for finite-size scaling analysis. Prior studies focused on resistor networks studied flow optimization, transport efficiency, and vulnerability in complex networks [19,27,30,31]. We analyze the behavior of cascading failures in the UCTE network, and propose mitigation strategies to reduce the vulnerability of the system against random failures or targeted attacks.…”

Cascading failures in complex networks

“…In fact, islanding, i.e. separating the power grid into disconnected independent parts can be an efficient tool for stopping cascade propagation [66,123]. Moreover, Ref.…”

Cascading failures in anisotropic interdependent networks of spatial modular structures

“…Therefore, great consideration was given to the study of interdependent networks and in particular their robustness, using percolation theory [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]. Such studies have been carried out to analyze cascading failures resulting from various attacks [26][27][28][29][30][31][32]. One of the key results in these types of studies is that often localized attacks are significantly more effective when compare to random attacks.…”