A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L.

doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.469

Cited by 633 publications

(401 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…Thereafter all participants work on a real effort task, the so-called slider task (Gill and Prowse 2012). On the computer screen 32 sliders on horizontal bars are displayed.…”

Section: Experiments Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

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Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries' final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals' risk preferences are predictive for giving inThe research documented in this paper was partly financed by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (project number 11429) and also received financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (project number 400-09-451). Uncertain (2017) 55:95-118 both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple nonlinear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries' side but less so when risk is on the givers' side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences. Electronic supplementary material

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“…Thereafter all participants work on a real effort task, the so-called slider task (Gill and Prowse 2012). On the computer screen 32 sliders on horizontal bars are displayed.…”

Section: Experiments Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

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“…Intuitively, being the favorite might induce a feeling of deserving to win. To capture this intuition, we rely on the idea of disappointment aversion (Bell, 1985, Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, Gill and Prowse, 2012. Accordingly, in addition to her payoff, a participant derives positive (negative) utility from receiving more (less) than expected.…”

Section: Disappointment Aversionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

March

Sahm

2017

Economics Letters

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“…Marzilli Ericson and Fuster (2011) provide evidence for expectation-based reference points in exchange and valuation experiments. Gill and Prowse (2012) show that subjects we use a data set from two leading soccer leagues, the German Bundesliga and the British Premier League, to show that the behavior of professional soccer players and coaches during matches depends significantly on whether or not their team is behind the expected match outcome. Professional bookmakers' pre-play betting odds on match outcomes allow us to construct a measure of expectations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Professional Soccer

Bartling

Brandes

Schunk³

2015

Management Science

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We show that professional soccer players and their coaches exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that players breach the rules of the game, measured by the referee's assignment of cards, significantly more often if their teams are behind the expected match outcome, measured by pre-play betting odds of large professional bookmakers. We further show that coaches implement significantly more offensive substitutions if their teams are behind expectations. Both types of behaviors impair the expected ultimate match outcome of the team, which shows that our findings do not simply reflect fully rational responses to referencedependent incentive schemes of favorite teams to falling behind. We derive these results in a data set that contains more than 8'200 matches from 12 seasons of the German Bundesliga and 12 seasons of the English Premier League.

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A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition

Cited by 633 publications

References 63 publications

Giving in the face of risk

Giving in the face of risk

Asymmetric discouragement in asymmetric contests

Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Professional Soccer

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