2019
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.305.6
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A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium

Abstract: We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.

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Cited by 3 publications
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References 22 publications
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