A State/Event Temporal Deontic Logic

Brunel, Julien; Bodeveix, Jean-Paul; Filali, Mamoun

doi:10.1007/11786849_9

Cited by 18 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Another extension of the approach would be to consider obligation requirements with deadline as suggested in [10,4]. We need to refine the definition of compliance given in this paper to consider these more complex requirements.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…So we have in fact two violation formulas Viol O (e), which means "e was (weakly) obligatory in the previous state, but it did not occur", and Viol P (e), which means "e has just happened without being permitted". We only consider in this paper immediate obligations, but we plan to take into account obligations with deadline, as suggested in [10,4].…”

Section: Security Policy Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

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Security policy compliance with violation management

Brunel

Cuppens

et al. 2007

Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering

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A security policy of an information system is a set of security requirements that correspond to permissions, prohibitions and obligations to execute some actions when some contextual conditions are satisfied. Traditional approaches consider that the information system enforces its associated security policy if and only if actions executed in this system are permitted by the policy (if the policy is closed) or not prohibited (if the policy is open) and every obligatory actions are actually executed in the system (no violation of obligations). In this paper, we investigate a more sophisticated approach in which an information system specification is compliant with its security policy even though some security requirements may be violated. Our proposal is to consider that this is acceptable when the security policy specifies additional requirements that apply in case of violation of other security requirements. In this case, we formally define conditions to be satisfied by an information system to comply with its security policy. We then present a proof-based approach to check if these conditions are enforced.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Security Policy Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

Security policy compliance with violation management

Brunel

Cuppens

et al. 2007

Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering

Self Cite

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“…One of the reasons is that deontic logic so far somehow remains one of the most controversial and least agreed-upon areas of logic, let alone the combination with temporal logic. For some recent works on modelling and management of obligations in terms of deontic logic, we refer to [5,3,7].…”

Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal digital license language with OTS/CafeOBJ method

Xiang

Bjørner

Futatsugi

2008

2008 IEEE/ACS International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications

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This paper discusses how to model digital licenses as observational transition systems (OTSs) with CafeOBJ, a formal algebraic specification language. To extend the concept of licensing to cover various application domains of digital rights management, we first analyze the concepts of permission and obligation with some real-world examples which are not covered by current XML-based Rights Expression Languages (RELs), and then discuss how to formally specify licenses in terms of deontic and temporal logic with OTS/CafeOBJ method. Several important deontic and temporal modeling issues of licenses are also addressed for discussion. The proposed formal license language can be used not only for the formal specifications of licenses which capture both static observations and dynamic state transitions of the licenses, but also for the formal verification of licenses thanks to the executability and theorem proving facility of CafeOBJ.

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“…There are mainly three approaches: relying on deontic logic as in [20], using a pure temporal approach as we did here, or a mix of both, for instance [26]. Deontic logic appears as a natural choice, however it is subject to few confusing paradoxes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Abstract Accountability Language: Translation, Compliance and Application

Benghabrit¹,

Grall²,

Royer³

et al. 2015

2015 Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC)

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With the rise of the services-based economy and the democratization of on-line services, more and more users (individual and/or business) use on-line applications in their daily lives. Usually personal data transits between different actors involved in a service's delivery chain (e.g. application/storage service providers) and thus might raise some privacy issues. Accountability, which is the property of an entity of being responsible for its acts, can help mitigate data privacy and data disclosures issues in such applications. In this paper, we propose a translational semantics for our accountability language and we present some expected properties. We introduce a natural criterion to achieve the accountability compliance of two clauses and few heuristics to speed up the resolution time. We demonstrate the feasibility of our verification process with a realistic health care use case and the TSPASS theorem prover.

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A State/Event Temporal Deontic Logic

Cited by 18 publications

References 19 publications

Security policy compliance with violation management

Security policy compliance with violation management

Formal digital license language with OTS/CafeOBJ method

Abstract Accountability Language: Translation, Compliance and Application

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