A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation

Abstract

The principle of Anteriority says that prospects that are identical from the perspective of every possible person’s welfare are equally good overall. The principle enjoys prima facie plausibility, and has been employed for various theoretical purposes. Here it is shown using an analogue of the St Petersburg Paradox that Anteriority is inconsistent with central principles of axiology.

Expected choiceworthiness and fanaticism

“…20 Of course, we could consider the weaker consequentialist thesis that the choiceworthiness of an option is greater than that of another i and because it has greater expected agent-neutral 20 See Thomas (2022) for arguments in favor of this view, called Separability, and for explanation of the close connection between Separability and total welfarist consequentialism. However, see Goodsell (2021) for an objection to a related principle (Anteriority) that draws on the St. Petersburg paradox.…”

Non-Archimedean population axiologies

“…See also Broome (2004) for a classic case against the intuition of neutrality, the view that it's axiologically neutral to add good lives to the world. 5 See Thomas (2022b) for an explication and defence of Separability; Goodsell (2021) for an objection to a principle to which Thomas (2022b) 2011) influential impossibility result in population axiologyat least in cases of choice under certainty. 7 For these reasons, I used to believe that non-Archimedeanism was the best game in town.…”