A Spoofing Attack against a Cancelable Biometric Authentication Scheme

Abstract

ID/password-based authentication is commonly used in network services. Some users set different ID/password pairs for different services, but other users reuse a pair of ID/password to other services. Such recycling allows the list attack in which an adversary tries to spoof a target user by using a list of IDs and passwords obtained from other system by some means (an insider attack, malwares, or even a DB leakage). As a countermeasure agains the list attack, biometric authentication attracts much attention than before.In 2012, Hattori et al. proposed a cancelable biometrics authentication scheme (fundamental scheme) based on homomorphic encryption algorithms. In the scheme, registered biometric information (template) and biometric information to compare are encrypted, and the similarity between these biometric information is computed with keeping encrypted. Only the privileged entity (a decryption center), who has a corresponding decryption key, can obtain the similarity by decrypting the encrypted similarity and judge whether they are same or not. Then, Hirano et al. showed the replay attack against this scheme, and, proposed two enhanced authentication schemes.In this paper, we propose a spoofing attack against the fundamental scheme when the feature vector, which is obtained by digitalizing the analogue biometric information, is represented as a binary coding such as IrisCode and Competitive Code. The proposed attack uses an unexpected vector as input, whose distance to all possible binary vectors is constant. Since the proposed attack is independent from the replay attack, the attack is also applicable to two revised schemes by Hirano et al. as well. Moreover, this paper also discusses possible countermeasures to the proposed spoofing attack. In fact, this paper proposes a countermeasure by detecting such unexpected vector.