A ‘southern model’ of electoral mobilisation? Clientelism and electoral politics in Spain

Abstract

You may cite this version as: Hopkin, Jonathan (2001). A 'Southern model' of electoral mobilisation? Clientelism and electoral politics in post-Franco Spain [online]. London: LSE Research Online. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000647 This is an electronic version of an Article published in West European politics, 24 (1). pp. 115-136 It is often argued that clientelism is a key feature of electoral mobilisation in Southern European democracies. This article examines the evidence for clientelism in the Spanish case, assessing the recruitment, redistributive strategies and electoral performance of governing parties in the 1977-96 period. It finds little evidence of extensive clientelistic mobilisation, finding instead that parties' use of state resources is largely consistent with their programmatic and ideological positions. 'Old' clientelism from the pre-democratic era mostly did not survive the change of regime, whilst 'new' clientelism based on the expansion of state employment contributed to the Socialist Party's organisational consolidation, but was not a significant feature of its strategy of electoral mobilisation.

How party linkages shape austerity politics: clientelism and fiscal adjustment in Greece and Portugal during the eurozone crisis

“…Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), we call these clientelistic linkages, defined as mechanisms of exchange in which selective goods are traded by parties in exchange of votes. Party patronage, or the "power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life" (Kopecký and Mair 2012b: 3) has been a particularly widespread form of clientelistic exchange, for instance in the political machines of US cities in the 19th and 20th century (Shefter 1994), Southern Europe (Hopkin 2001), or Eastern Europe (Kopecký and Spirova 2011; for an overview, see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;Piattoni 2001). …”

“…2 Besides these similarities, Greece and Portugal display a substantial degree of variation in the extent of clientelistic linkages (our independent variable) as measured by the indicators mentioned above. Party patronage and clientelism have been a prominent feature of party systems in Southern Europe as a whole (di Mascio et al 2010;Hopkin 2001). However, Kopecký and Mair (2012a: 367) show that there is significant variation across European countries.…”

A comparative analysis of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey: the rural–urban divide

“…Clientelism, be it in rural areas or urban centres, persists in democratic era (Fernandes, 2014). Especially, urban modes of clientelism, particularly in the form of 'bureaucratic clientelism' (Lyrintzis, 1987), through distribution of state resources and political favours to party devotees, prevails in the Spanish politics (Hopkin, 2001;Pujas & Rhodes, 1999). Alienated by clientelistic and corrupt networks of system parties and exhausted by economic hardships, many Spaniards have started to challenge the status quo in recent years.…”

Patronage Politics and Clientelism in Housing Welfare: The Case of Gawad Kalinga (GK) Villages in Parañaque City, The Philippines

“…In electoral politics, Teehankee (2002) opined that clientelism and nepotism have reinforced the elitist nature of Philippine elections and democracy. Hedman (2010) succinctly captured this when she claimed that the possibilities and the promise of further democratization in the Philippines have continued to struggle against the familiar politics of clientelism, among many other obstacles. By and large, in the Philippines as in elsewhere, clientelism entails patterns of service provision and resource distribution that overprivilege some groups to the exclusion of others (Reid, 2008).…”