A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education

Weiss, Andrew

doi:10.1086/261156

Cited by 107 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They may do this because it is expensive to measure cognitive skills directly, so they use schooling as a proxy (Gottfredson 1985). In this signaling framework, Weiss (1983) considers a model of education in which students are tested. He assumes that passing grades are productive in themselves: if two students of the same type receive different grades, they have different market values.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

More Than Just Good Grades: Candidates’ Perceptions About the Skills and Attributes Employers Seek in New Graduates

Velasco

2012

Journal of Business Economics and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. There is a common belief among university students that they have to study hard attempting to earn high grades because employers are targeting graduates with outstanding academic records. However, this idea does not seem to capture what is actually happening in organizations, as firms value more aspects related with personality and other personal qualities of young graduates. We present a case study of the hiring process of recent university graduates to test these hypotheses. The methodology used follows a twostage approach. Principal component analysis allows us to identify first key categories of skills and attributes that influence the selection process. Then, using econometric analysis, a matrix classifies them according to employer size and type, degree, position and industry. The results show that soft skills (personality and other qualities) are the most required attributes in the selection process. Good academic records only matter in the public sector.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

More Than Just Good Grades: Candidates’ Perceptions About the Skills and Attributes Employers Seek in New Graduates

Velasco

2012

Journal of Business Economics and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Spence's model, prior to trade, the seller chooses a signaling action that carries a type-dependent cost. However, as pointed out by Weiss (1983) and Admati and Perry (1987), in many markets, costly signaling takes time to materialize. Indeed the signaling action in Spence's primary application is the amount of time spent in school.…”

Section: Dynamic Adverse Selection and Dynamic Signalingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons

2012

Econometrica

191

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information (news) about the value of a privately informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We construct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure. The no-trade period ends in one of two ways: either enough good news arrives, restoring confidence and markets reopen, or bad news arrives, making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is, a partial sell-off of low-value assets. Conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided. We analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news. Higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes. Our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem-in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news, reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure.

show abstract

“…Moreover, commitment is rare so agents make a new decision in every period; in particular, the seller can quit signaling at any time. This lack of commitment is likely to disturb signaling, as pointed out by Weiss (1983), Admati and Perry (1987), and Swinkels (1999).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cho and Kreps (1987) formalized this and showed that if the worker can commit to the length of education, then, in the unique equilibrium satisfying standard refinements, the agent obtains least-costly full separation (known as the 'Riley outcome', Riley (1979)). Weiss (1983) and Admati and Perry (1987) pointed out that long-term commitment is difficult in many markets and may disturb signaling. Swinkels (1999) formalized this argument in a paper that is the most related to ours.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Kremer

Skrzypacz

2003

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the effect a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on signaling and trading in a dynamic model. Competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject these offers and delay trade. This delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to the duration of the delay. We show how the external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If the signal is not fully revealing, then there is no trade just before the revelation of external information. A lemons market develops endogenously over time and prevents any trade close to the release of the public announcement. On the other hand, if the external signal is fully revealing, then trade occurs even close to the final period; however, in this case there is a discontinuity in prices.JEL classification: C73, C78, D82.

show abstract

A Sorting-cum-Learning Model of Education

Cited by 107 publications

References 7 publications

More Than Just Good Grades: Candidates’ Perceptions About the Skills and Attributes Employers Seek in New Graduates

More Than Just Good Grades: Candidates’ Perceptions About the Skills and Attributes Employers Seek in New Graduates

Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons

Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About