A Simple Theory of Intrinsicality

Witmer, D. Gene

doi:10.1515/9783110292596.111

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Like R I *, a grounding account, such as Rosen's (2010) and Witmer's (2014), avoids each of these problems. However, as shown in section 3 (with great help from Marshall's 2013 discussion), it seems that intrinsic properties might be grounded in facts about distinct objects.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If this explanatory account is correct, then there is reason to suspect that depending on our explanatory purposes, property F might count as one that x has intrinsically at t or as one that x has extrinsically at t.  The mixed cases make it tempting to regard the local notion of intrinsicality as more fundamental than the global notion, as Figdor (2008Figdor ( , 2014 and Bader (2013) make clear. Although see Witmer (2014), in this anthology, for an intriguing defense of the claim that the global notion is in fact the more basic.  One might argue that despite the evidence to the contrary (offered by Eddon, Figdor, and Bader), a hyperintensional approach should actually be rejected.…”

Section: The Grounding Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Francescotti¹

2014

Companion to Intrinsic Properties

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A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing … A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is … The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing … If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect duplicate of that thing … (Lewis 1983a, p. 197) I once offered a definition that was meant to capture the notion expressed by the intuitive descriptions in this quote from Lewis.¹ The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x's having F consists entirely in x'sha ving certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one's relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one's proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here I wish to provide additional support for it and defend it against some objections that have been raised. In the process I aim to make the account somewhat more precise, especially by contrasting it with a grounding approach to defining the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. In Favor of a Hyperintensional AccountConsider those properties that must be exemplified by any item that exists. Following Weatherson and Marshall (2013), let's call them "indiscriminately necessary" properties. Being self-identical is an indiscriminately necessary property. Unlike the property of being identical with Dennett, being self-identical is a property that cannot go unexemplified by anything. In addition to being indiscriminately necessary, the property of being self-identical also seems to be intrinsic; having this property does not seem to be a matter of how an item relates to anything distinct from itself. While this one seems intrinsic, some indiscriminately necessary properties (INPs) appear to be extrinsic. Assuming that numbers exist and exist necessarily, the property of coexisting with the number 9 is an INP. Given realism about numbers, our coexisting with 9 consists in our relation to something distinct from ourselves, which seems to make it an extrinsic feature of you and me.  See Francescotti (1999).

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Grounding Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Francescotti¹

2014

Companion to Intrinsic Properties

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“…They are intrinsic to those objects, just in the sense that an object can have an immanent property no matter what is going on outside of it, no matter what other objects are like. (Compare Francescotti and Witmer on intrinsicality.) It is not sufficient for intrinsicality, in the relevant sense, that some feature be bound to be shared by duplicates (per Langton and Lewis ).…”

Section: Property Immanencementioning

confidence: 97%

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

Audi

2018

Nous

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Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly‐veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects (partial intrinsic resemblance) requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object is roughly for it to be wholly present in that object. (So understood, immanence does not imply repeatability, and thus tropes count as immanent.) If two objects are intrinsically similar in one way but not another, there must be a difference between the two ways. And if the similarity is between the objects as they are in themselves, then this difference, too, must be within the objects. Partial intrinsic resemblance thus requires internal structure. Without it, there can be no distinctions between ways in which things are intrinsically alike and ways in which they aren't. I will argue, further, that distinctions between properties that transcend objects fail to account for the possibility of partial intrinsic resemblance.

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“…Furthermore, if one thinks that the most plausible way to underpin assumptions (1) and ( 2) is by exploiting the relationship between intrinsicality and grounding, perhaps one could avoid the appeal to independence or independence* and use grounding alone to formulate a criterion of intrinsicality instead. A criterion to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic properties solely in terms of grounding would render Langton and Lewis's independence criterion redundant, making the hybrid 30 See also Witmer 2014. 31 See Bauer (2011 for some discussion of examples in which the instantiation of extrinsic properties does not appear to require their being grounded by distinct entities.…”

Section: Strategy 2: Adding Constraints To Wbt Groundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding

Allen

2020

Metaphysica

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This paper investigates the plausibility of Witmer, Butchard and Trogdon’s proposal to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic ones in terms of independence from accompaniment and grounding. I argue that the proposed criterion is not adequate to determine intrinsicality, since according to it some intuitively extrinsic properties turn out to be intrinsic. I suggest and evaluate two responses: first, one could characterize a conception of independence which is specific to the individual instantiating the property; and second, one could justify two assumptions about properties which entail that counterexample properties of the kinds I present do not exist, most importantly that there are no fundamental properties which are instantiated in an intrinsic fashion by some individuals and an extrinsic fashion by others. Although the latter seems prima facie plausible, I present some potential counterexamples to it from current physical theory. I conclude that the grounding- and independence-based criterion of intrinsicality can be defended from my objections, although the cost of doing so might make it more attractive to characterize intrinsicality in terms of independence, or in terms of grounding, alone.

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A Simple Theory of Intrinsicality

Cited by 8 publications

References 5 publications

Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding

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