A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders

Abstract

A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employments opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K14, K42

Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed

“…See also Mungan (2010:174), arguing for the plausibility of this assumption: "This is a commonly employed assumption in the literature. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Burnovski and Safra (1994), Chu et al (2000), Nyborg and Telle (2004), and Miceli and Bucci (2005) are examples of models which impose this assumption. Furthermore, when general enforcement is possible, for low levels of harm, p can be treated as a fixed value although it is endogenously determined.…”

“…4 To derive the 2 Two exceptions are Emons (2007) and Rousseau (2009) which are discussed later in this section. For models dealing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders see Chu et al (2000), Emons (2003Emons ( , 2004, Miceli and Bucci (2005), Mungan (2010Mungan ( , 2012, Polinsky and Shavell (1998), and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991). For a general review of the law and economics literature on law enforcement, see Garoupa (1997), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), and Polinsky and Shavell (2007).…”

Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?

“…Au plan théorique, il semble qu'aucune justi…cation n'ait été donnée en faveur de l'optimalité d'une pénalité croissante avec le nombre d'infractions commises; voir plus récemment Emons (2007) et Miceli et Bucci (2004). de la dissuasion), via le choix de la fréquence des contrôles et du niveau des sanctions.…”

Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders

“…So far it has been established in the law and economics literature that under certain circumstances escalating penalty schemes may be optimal. There are a number of studies, for example by Rubinstein (1979Rubinstein ( , 1980, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), Polinsky and Shavell (1998), Baik and Kim (2001), Chu et al (2000), Miceli and Bucci (2005) or Endres and Rundshagen (2012), which provided justifications for escalating penalties. Other studies, however, show that for various reasons, optimal deterrence may actually involve declining penalties for repeat offenders (see, for example, Burnovski and Safra (1994); Dana (2001); Emons (2003) or Emons (2007) 1 ).…”