A simple decision model of counterproliferation

McCormick, Gordon H.; Owen, Guillermo

doi:10.1016/s0895-7177(98)00073-9

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…As in McCormick and Owen (1998), there are two parameters, θ and τ , which correspond to the speed with which (a) an Entrant is able to complete his weapons development program, and (b) the Incumbent discovers that the program is underway. More specifically, the time at which the Entrant's first weapons system is deployed, W , and the time at which his program is discovered, Z, are two exponential random variables with parameters θ and τ , respectively.…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Incumbent, himself, however, is also a player in this game and the choices he makes will have a bearing on the calculations and decisions made by any future rivals. In McCormick and Owen (1998) we studied the alternatives that the Incumbent faces once an Entrant has decided to enter. As our findings in this work already show, however, the Incumbent (by signaling his type) can also influence a future Entrant's decision to act or not act in the first place, depending upon how he chooses to respond to early challenges.…”

Section: Playing Against Multiple Entrantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In McCormick and Owen (1998) we studied the decision problem faced by an "Incumbent" state (which already possesses a nuclear capability) which observes that a rival "Entrant" has begun to develop a nuclear capability of its own. The problem, we explained, can be examined in two phases: Phase I, in which the Entrant begins and completes his weapons development program, and Phase II, which will begin once a weapons capability has been deployed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Game Model of Counterproliferation, With Multiple Entrants

McCormick

Owen

2006

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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We consider a game-theoretic model of counterproliferation, in which a single Incumbent (holding nuclear weapons) is faced with a sequence of potential Entrants (who are considering developing and deploying a nuclear capability or other weapons of mass destruction of their own). The Incumbent can either choose to act preemptively, with certain costs, or allow the Entrants to deploy a nuclear capability, with consequent costs due to the potential for nuclear blackmail. How should each of the players decide?The players' decisions are optimally based not only on their own cost functions (which each knows) but also on their opponent's cost structure (which is known only in probability). Entrants (other than the first) can learn something about the Incumbent's cost structure from decisions they have made in the past. It turns out that, depending on a would-be Entrant's cost structure, a record of preemption by the Incumbent can have either a deterrent or provocation effect. Understanding the basis for each of these contradictory effects is critical to designing an optimal counterproliferation strategy.

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Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Playing Against Multiple Entrantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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