IEEE INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications 2017
DOI: 10.1109/infocom.2017.8057200
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A signaling game model for moving target defense

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Cited by 43 publications
(32 citation statements)
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“…Consequently, optimal defensive strategy is formulated. Feng et al[42] proposed Bayesian Stackelberg dynamic game model to select strategy in generalized network confrontation with MTD. By comparing hidden transformation and transformation with feedback signal, it verifies that MTD can increase defense benefit by transmitting wrong signal deliberately to mislead attackers.5.1.2.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, optimal defensive strategy is formulated. Feng et al[42] proposed Bayesian Stackelberg dynamic game model to select strategy in generalized network confrontation with MTD. By comparing hidden transformation and transformation with feedback signal, it verifies that MTD can increase defense benefit by transmitting wrong signal deliberately to mislead attackers.5.1.2.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Through simulation, they showed that their game model can provide optimal defensive strategies for the VM which can effectively fail the co-resident attack. Feng et al [49] investigated how the strategies of information disclosure by defenders can improve the effectiveness of MTD techniques based on Bayesian Stackelberg game theory. They designed a signaling game based on the concept of the Bayesian Persuasion Model to consider how a defender signals an attacker and how the attacker responds to the signal in their decision making process.…”
Section: A Game Theory-based Mtdmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The examples include platform migrations or system diversity [20,30,46,49], server location migrations [51,158], software stack diversity [161], proxy shuffling [83], or IP mutation [34]. Main Attacks: Most MTD approaches developed for enterprise networks countermeasured worm attacks [51], DDoS [51,83,158], abstracted attacks in an attack-defense game [49], scanning attacks [20,30,34], APT attacks [161], or more sophisticated, multi-stage attacks, including circumvention attacks, deputy attacks, entropy reducing attacks, probing attacks, and incremental attacks [46]. Key Methodologies: Since majority of existing MTD approaches have used game theoretic approaches, many MTD techniques for enterprise networks have used in an attackdefense game where the MTD techniques are used as defense strategies.…”
Section: A Enterprise Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Although they realized that security alerts play an important role in effective move selection, the cost of the moves was ignored. Feng et al [24] proposed a Bayesian Stackelberg game that models the joint migration and signaling strategies for the defender in the face of a strategic and rational attacker and demonstrated that MTD can be improved through strategic information disclosure. Markov Decision Process(MDP) based approach has been utilized to analyze and further select optimal policies by many researchers [25][26][27], while Lei et al [28] proposed a novel of incomplete information Markov game theoretic approach to strategy generation.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%