A security regime among democracies: cooperation among Iroquois nations

Abstract

In precolonial and colonial North America five Iroquois nations, which previously had fought for generations, stopped wars among themselves and lived in peace for about 325 years. This history raises several questions: why did the Iroquois nations stop fighting each other; did the fact that each nation was a democracy have anything to do with the end of war among them; and what are the lessons of this peace for international relations scholars? A security regime formed by the Iroquois in 1450, known as the Iroquois League, accounts for the peace. Comparing the Iroquois League with the Concert of Europe indicates an important role for norms and institutionalization in ameliorating the security dilemma. Further, the five democratic nations that formed the Iroquois League exemplify Immanuel Kant's idea of a system for “perpetual peace.” Finally, the history of the Iroquois League challenges realist claims of cross-cultural and timeless validity.

A constitutionalising global order: an introduction

“…For example, more research on cultural practices and how they might question regulatory mechanisms of modern constitutionalisation need to be explored in order to better account for cultural diversity (Borrows 1994;Williams 2009). Others have pointed to the ways forms of global governance can be drawn from experiences such as the Iroquois nations in North America (Crawford 1994).…”

Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes, and the Prisoner's Dilemma

“…Another explanation is that democracies are generally pluralist societies and leaders may be constrained by segments of the population that are opposed to war (Russett, 1990). Finally, scholars have argued that democratic institutions require a level of transparency that reduces misperception regarding intentions and capabilities (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992;Crawford, 1994;Fearon, 1994;Starr, 1997). Because a state can never be sure of another's intentions, transparency is important in helping states to discern the hawkish or dovish nature of an opponent (Starr, 1997).…”

Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?

“…Authoritarian leaders also often experience such constraints as one learns from numero u s accounts of factional rivalry and bureaucratic politics in Nazi G e rm a n y, Maoist China, and many countries in Latin America and the Middle East where fragile civilian govern m e n t s face scrutiny and challenge from military generals and Muslim clerics re s p e c t i v e l y. As well, norms of part i s a n adjustment, informal consultation, and consensus building can exist in non-democracies, including pre-industrial polities (e.g., Crawford 1994;Ember et al 1992). There f o re , some of the causal mechanisms suggested by the stru c t u r a l perspective may be weak or lacking in some formal democracies, while some others may exist and operate beyond the f o rmal democracies.…”