A secure authentication scheme for session initiation protocol by using ECC on the basis of the Tang and Liu scheme

Irshad, Azeem; Sher, Muhammad; Faisal, Muhammad Shahzad; Ghani, Anwar; Hassan, Mahmood ul; Ashraf, Shehzad

doi:10.1002/sec.834

Cited by 41 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The existing work [6,7,[15][16][17][18][19][20][21] of SCADA security has employed the end-to-end developments to secure the communication of SCADA systems. A number of limitations and dependencies are found during end-to-end developments [8,19,27].…”

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23] has been conducted on the vulnerable aspects of SCADA systems. Specifically, cryptography mechanisms have been developed to enhance the security of these critical systems, and most of these developments have been successful.…”

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Few cryptography mechanisms [12,23,24,48] are proposed for SCADA/DNP3 systems in case of one-to-one communication, and are inappropriated while employing public key cryptography in broadcasting communication. Public key cryptography based mechanisms required much time during key generation, distribution, and algorithm computation [16,17,22,[48][49][50]. On the other side, symmetric cryptography solutions are unable to protect SCADA communication against non-repudiation attacks [8,16,23].…”

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Public key cryptography based mechanisms required much time during key generation, distribution, and algorithm computation [16,17,22,[48][49][50]. On the other side, symmetric cryptography solutions are unable to protect SCADA communication against non-repudiation attacks [8,16,23].…”

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several security mechanisms, including security pattern approaches, TLS/SSL, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Shell (SSH), hardware/software firewalls, demilitarized zones (DMZs), authentication protocols, and cryptography solutions, have been designed and deployed to protect industrial communication against vulnerabilities and potential attacks [6,7,[13][14][15]. Among these security approaches, cryptography based mechanisms are suggested as the best security approaches, due to their independence and implementation evaluation [8,[16][17][18][19]. SCADA security via cryptography mechanisms has been considered as a vital approach during transmission [19][20][21][22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

et al. 2015

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Modern technology enhancements have been used worldwide to fulfill the requirements of the industrial sector, especially in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems as a part of industrial control systems (ICS). SCADA systems have gained popularity in industrial automations due to technology enhancements and connectivity with modern computer networks and/or protocols. The procurement of new technologies has made SCADA systems important and helpful to processing in oil lines, water treatment plants, and electricity generation and control stations. On the other hand, these systems have vulnerabilities like other traditional computer networks (or systems), especially when interconnected with open platforms. Many international organizations and researchers have proposed and deployed solutions for SCADA security enhancement, but most of these have been based on node-to-node security, without emphasizing critical sessions that are linked directly with industrial processing and automation. This study concerns SCADA security measures related to critical processing with specified sessions of automated polling, analyzing cryptography mechanisms and deploying the appropriate explicit inclusive security solution in a distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) stack, as part of a SCADA system. The bytes flow through the DNP3 stack with security OPEN ACCESSSymmetry 2015, 7 1946 computational bytes within specified critical intervals defined for polling. We took critical processing knowledge into account when designing a SCADA/DNP3 testbed and deploying a cryptography solution that did not affect communications.

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Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Study Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

et al. 2015

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Cryptanalysis of smart‐card‐based password authenticated key agreement protocol for session initiation protocol of Zhang et al.

Jiang

Tian

2014

Int J Communication

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As the core signaling protocol for multimedia services, such as voice over internet protocol, the session initiation protocol (SIP) is receiving much attention and its security is becoming increasingly important. It is critical to develop a roust user authentication protocol for SIP. The original authentication protocol is not strong enough to provide acceptable security level, and a number of authentication protocols have been proposed to strengthen the security. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed an efficient and flexible smart-card-based password authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP. They claimed that the protocol enjoys many unique properties and can withstand various attacks. However, we demonstrate that the scheme by Zhang et al. is insecure against the malicious insider impersonation attack. Specifically, a malicious user can impersonate other users registered with the same server. We also proposed an effective fix to remedy the flaw, which remedies the security flaw without sacrificing the efficiency. The lesson learned is that the authenticators must be closely coupled with the identity, and we should prevent the identity from being separated from the authenticators in the future design of two-factor authentication protocols. schemes into four classes, that is, password authenticated key agreement based, hash and symmetric encryption based, public key cryptography based and identity-based schemes. The public key cryptography based schemes can be further classified into Rivest Shamir Adleman and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based schemes. In this paper, we mainly review the protocols closely related to our work.In 2005, Yang et al. [6] proposed an authentication protocol based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. But their protocol was later found to be vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack. Moreover, their scheme is not suitable for end user devices with limited computing capability because of the involvement of expensive modular exponentiations. In 2009, Wu et al. [7] proposed an authentication scheme for SIP based on ECC. Although they claimed that their scheme was provably secure, Yoon et al. [8] demonstrated that the protocol by Wu et al. is insecure against the offline password guessing attack. Yoon et al. also presented an improved authentication protocol for SIP based on ECC. However, the scheme by Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack. Also in 2009, Tsai [9] presented a nonce-based authentication protocol, which only involves one-way hash function. However, Yoon et al. [10] showed that Tsai's protocol [9] suffers from the offline password guessing attack, the stolen verifier attack, and so on. In 2012, Xie [11] showed that the scheme of Yoon et al. [10] is vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack. Xie also proposed a new security-enhanced authentication protocol for SIP using ECC. Arshad et al. [12] also pointed out that Tsai's scheme [9] is insecure against the offline password guessing attack and stolen ve...

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A lightweight anonymous authentication scheme for consumer roaming in ubiquitous networks with provable security

Farash

Chaudhry

Heydari

et al. 2015

Int J Communication

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Ubiquitous networks provide roaming service for mobile nodes enabling them to use the services extended by their home networks in a foreign network. A mutual authentication scheme between the roamed mobile node and the foreign network is needed to be performed through the home network. Various authentication schemes have been developed for such networks, but most of them failed to achieve security in parallel to computational efficiency. Recently, Shin et al. and Wen et al. separately proposed two efficient authentication schemes for roaming service in ubiquitous networks. Both argued their schemes to satisfy all the security requirements for such systems. However, in this paper, we show that Shin et al.'s scheme is susceptible to: (i) user traceability; (ii) user impersonation; (iii) service provider impersonation attacks; and (iv) session key disclosure. Furthermore, we show that Wen et al.'s scheme is also insecure against: (i) session key disclosure; and (ii) known session key attacks. To conquer the security problems, we propose an improved authentication scheme with anonymity for consumer roaming in ubiquitous networks. The proposed scheme not only improved the security but also retained a lower computational cost as compared with existing schemes. We prove the security of proposed scheme in random oracle model. of 20Step 1: MN ! FA: M 1 D ¹M V 1 ; M V 2 ; M V 3 º MN inputs his identity ID MN and password P W MN . MN then computes h.ID M jjh.P W MN // and checks if the result and A MN stored in his mobile device are of 20 4 Mobile node chooses its identity ID MN , password P W MN , and a random number d . Further, MN computes f D h.ID MN kP W MN kd /. Finally, MN sends ID MN and f to the HA by using some secure channel. HA computes K MN D h.ID MN jjx/˚f using secret x. Further, HA pledges a counter ct r MN D 0 for MN and forms a record .ID MN ; ct r MN / in his database. HA then engraves the smart card (SC MN ) with K MN , ct r MN , h.:/, and n. HA issues the smart card (SC MN ) to MN. After obtaining the smart card (SC MN ), MN computes f D h.ID MN˚P W MN˚d / and writes f on SC MN . Finally, the SC MN contains ¹ct r MN ; K MN ; f ; n; d , h.:/º. Login and authentication phaseThe procedure for login and authentication is outlined in Figure 3; the same is illustrated as follows: (1) MN ! FA W M 1 . MN inserts his smart card (SC MN ) in the reader and enters his identity ID MN and password P W MN . SC MN computes f 0 D h.ID MN˚P W MN˚d / and then verifies whether f 0 D f or not. If f 0 ¤ f , the login phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, SC MN computes K MN D K MN˚h .ID MN kP W MN kd /. Then SC MN generates random n MN and computes ct r MN D ct r MN C 1 and V 1 D .ID MN jj K MN jjn MN jjct r MN jjID FA / 2 modn. Finally, MN sends the M 1 D .V 1 ; ct r MN ; ID HA / to FA.Figure 3. Wen et al.'s scheme [38]. Proposition 5 (Secure key establishment)The improved scheme provides secure key establishment. ProofAfter completion of the protocol, the MN, FA, and HA will establish a common session key SK FA D SK MN ...

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A secure authentication scheme for session initiation protocol by using ECC on the basis of the Tang and Liu scheme

Cited by 41 publications

References 32 publications

New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

New Security Development and Trends to Secure the SCADA Sensors Automated Transmission during Critical Sessions

Cryptanalysis of smart‐card‐based password authenticated key agreement protocol for session initiation protocol of Zhang et al.

A lightweight anonymous authentication scheme for consumer roaming in ubiquitous networks with provable security

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