Algeria's Path to Reform: Authentic Change?

Algeria's Roles in the OAU/African Union: From National Liberation Promoter to Leader in the Global War on Terrorism

“…The Constitutional revision, approved by the People is promulgated by the President of the Republic'. The lifting of that obstacle in 2008, without referendum, but with full approval from the deputies who had been co-opted beforehand, enabled him to run for and win a third term in April 2009 (Zoubir & Aghrout, 2012). And again, in February 2014, in spite of his very poor health and debatable performance record, the government declared that Bouteflika would run for a fourth term, which he won on 17 April 2014.…”

Challenges to Democratization Process in Algeria

“…The socioeconomic differences are so high that common Algerians are called Hogra who is rough-hewn rioters. They reinforced their frustration against the regime (Zoubir & Aghrout, 2012, p. 3).…”

“…Until 2009 the government consisted of three parties: the National Liberation Front (FLN), National Rally for Democracy (RND), and Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) called “presidential alliance” abstained by Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). Bouteflika had constituted this alliance to consolidate his presidency against the wishes of Le Pouvior (Zoubir & Aghrout, 2012). By applying a subtle strategy of “pacification,” the alliance around the president intends to take control of all of Algerian society, by every means, even at risk of tarnishing its democratic image, which it cultivates for its foreign clientele tempted by the petroleum reserves.…”

“…New waves of grassroots riots and demonstrations throughout the country emboldened the organized Algerian political opposition especially, the political parties, human rights league, autonomous trade unions, women organizations, and other groups to challenge the regime’s tight holds on the country (Porter, 2011, p. 326). Regime had adopted new legislation whereby the armed forces were permitted to continue their mission as defined under the emergency law to fight terrorism and subversion (Zoubir & Aghrout, 2012, p. 6). During the protests, even the presidency made only symbolic concessions along with heavy repression against the demonstrators.…”

From Peak to Trough: Decline of the Algerian “Islamist Vote”

“…The grievance perspective, though offers partial answers, does not offer wholly satisfactory explanations. The assumption is problematic as it could not interpret why Islamic political parties were defeated crushingly at the ballot box in Algeria, but obtained a landslide victory in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco in the early 2010s (see Table 3) (Zoubir and Aghrout 2012), considering that the four countries were almost in the same socio-economic predicaments at the time (see Table 1). …”