A Scalable RFID Authentication Protocol Supporting Ownership Transfer and Controlled Delegation

Fernàndez-Mir, Albert; Trujillo-Rasúa, Rolando; Castellà‐Roca, Jordi; Domingo-Ferrer, Josep

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25286-0_10

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Also, in addition to not being EPC compliant due to the use of hash operations and encryption functions, the protocol does not handle the privacy among the shared owners. More recent protocols such as [50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57] are not suitable for low-cost passive tags because they use hash functions or keyed encryption functions. New shared secret between TTP and Owners in a Owner-Group STs n New shared secret between TTP and Tags in a Tag-Group S1r; S2r…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure ownership transfer for multi-tag multi-owner passive RFID environment with individual-owner-privacy

Sundaresan

Doss

Zhou

et al. 2015

Computer Communications

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure ownership transfer for multi-tag multi-owner passive RFID environment with individual-owner-privacy

Sundaresan

Doss

Zhou

et al. 2015

Computer Communications

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“…At the opposite of this mechanism, the proposal [16] has the advantage of supporting controlled delegation without needing a counter on the tag's side. Fernndez-Mir et al propose the RFID protocol that not only achieves controlled delegation but also improves the system scalability [17].…”

Section: B) Resistance To Dos Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Scalable RFID Delegation Protocol

Chen¹,

Cao²,

Guo³

2014

Appl. Math. Inf. Sci.

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Abstract:The radio frequency identification (RFID) protocols are vulnerable to various attacks from an active or passive adversary. We shed light upon some existing security flaws in these delegation protocols. It is useful to mitigate many security weaknesses in such delegation protocols to promote the acceptance of RFID tags. We propose that a scalable RFID delegation protocol will be against traceability attacks with a stateful variant so that it provides the claimed security requirements. Compared with the previous schemes, we emphasize three critical distinctions in our protocol. First, the reader and the tag decrease one bitwise XOR of the message and reduce the computational complexity. Second, a solution to reducing the maximum search complexity can be that add two different flags to the tags responses in order to distinguish delegation request from delegation update. Third, the number of exchanged flows during different cases of our revision is same. Finally, the proposed scheme achieves scalability and untraceability property without leading to a security collision.

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“…A scalable authentication protocol which supports the ownership transfer was proposed in [5]. The protocol provides the controlled delegation without using the non-volatile memory to store a counter.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure RFID Ownership Transfer Protocols

Susilo

Varadharajan

2013

Information Security Practice and Experience

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An RFID tag could change hands many times during its lifetime. In a retail chain, the ownership of the tag is instituted by the supplier who initially owns the tag. In the view of a buyer, the validity of the current tag ownership and the originality of supplier are most important. In typical RFID ownership transfer protocols, the knowledge of the tag's authentication key proves the ownership. However, it is insufficient against an active attacker, since tags are usually lack of tamper-proof protections. Ownership transfer relies on a successful verification of tag's supplier and current ownership. In this paper, we formally define the security model of ownership transfer protocols and propose a secure ownership transfer protocol. In our scheme, current owner provides a new owner with the evidence of transfer and a proof of tag origin. Key management becomes easy in our system, since the one asymmetric verification key of the owner can be used to verify multiple tags that belong to the owner. Abstract. An RFID tag could change hands many times during its lifetime. In a retail chain, the ownership of the tag is instituted by the supplier who initially owns the tag. In the view of a buyer, the validity of the current tag ownership and the originality of supplier are most important. In typical RFID ownership transfer protocols, the knowledge of the tag's authentication key proves the ownership. However, it is insufficient against an active attacker, since tags are usually lack of tamperproof protections. Ownership transfer relies on a successful verification of tag's supplier and current ownership. In this paper, we formally define the security model of ownership transfer protocols and propose a secure ownership transfer protocol. In our scheme, current owner provides a new owner with the evidence of transfer and a proof of tag origin. Key management becomes easy in our system, since the one asymmetric verification key of the owner can be used to verify multiple tags that belong to the owner.

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A Scalable RFID Authentication Protocol Supporting Ownership Transfer and Controlled Delegation

Cited by 20 publications

References 16 publications

Secure ownership transfer for multi-tag multi-owner passive RFID environment with individual-owner-privacy

Secure ownership transfer for multi-tag multi-owner passive RFID environment with individual-owner-privacy

A New Scalable RFID Delegation Protocol

Secure RFID Ownership Transfer Protocols

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