A routing protocol for socially selfish delay tolerant networks

Abstract

Existing routing algorithms for Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) assume that nodes are willing to forward packets for others. In the real world, however, most people are socially selfish; i.e., they are willing to forward packets for nodes with whom they have social ties but not others, and such willingness varies with the strength of the social tie. Following the philosophy of design for user, we propose a Social Selfishness Aware Routing (SSAR) algorithm to cope with user selfishness and provide good routing performance in an efficient way. To select an effective forwarding node, SSAR considers both users' willingness to forward and their contact opportunity, and derives a metric with mathematical modeling and machine learning techniques to measure the forwarding capability of the mobile nodes. Moreover, SSAR formulates the data forwarding process as a Multiple Knapsack Problem with Assignment Restrictions (MKPAR) to satisfy user demands for selfishness and performance. Trace-driven simulations show that SSAR allows users to maintain selfishness and achieves good routing performance with low transmission cost.tunity with the destination. To further improve performance, SSAR formulates the forwarding process as a Multiple Knapsack Problem with Assignment Restrictions (MKPAR). It provides a heuristic-based solution that forwards the most effective packets for social selfishness and routing performance. Extensive trace-driven simulations show that SSAR can achieve good routing performance with low transmission cost.The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of SSAR. Section 3 gives the detailed design. Section 4 introduces the trace-driven simulations and discusses the results. The last two sections present related work and conclusions, respectively. SSAR OverviewIn this section, we first introduce our design philosophy and then discuss our models and assumptions. Finally, wegive an overview of SSAR and explain how it works. Design for UserExisting work in mobile ad hoc networks and DTNs has focused on addressing individual selfishness using reputation-based [30], credit-based [14], or game-theory based [12] approaches to stimulate users to cooperate and forward packets for others. If the nodes cooperate with others, they will be able to get help from others; if not, they will be punished, e.g., being deprived of access to the network.These incentive-based schemes may not be directly applied to deal with social selfishness, since they do not consider social selfishness. In these schemes, every node has to provide service to others no matter there is a social tie or not. Thus, social selfishness is not allowed. In essence, these approaches follow the philosophy of "design for network" because they sacrifice the user's requirement for selfishness (i.e., resource saving) to achieve high performance.We address this problem from a different point of view. We allow social selfishness but also try to maintain good routing performance under social selfish behavior. Our underlying ph...

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