A review on family ownership and information asymmetry

Jabee, Maryam

doi:10.5897/ajbmx11.025

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 77 publications

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“…This finding is different from previous research by Srinidhi and Liao (2014) that finds that familyowned firms have lower likelihood to crash because family ownership provides better incentives to monitor managerial activities. This finding also does not support the no-tion that family-owned firms have more tendency to delay the release of information from minority shareholders in order to expropriate from them (Jabeen and Shah, 2011), which according to Jin and Myers (2006) leads to higher risk of firmspecific crash.…”

Section: Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 78%

“…This is because in family firms with Type II agency problems, controlling shareholders have more incentive to hide information away from minority shareholders, thus increasing firmspecific crash risk. This notion is supported by the finding by Jabeen and Shah (2011) that finds that existence of Type II agency problem on family-owned firms affect the flow of information that are allowed to be released by controlling shareholders to the public. It is therefore necessary to differentiate different types of family ownership in order to gain better understanding of the effect of family ownership on a certain firm's outcome.…”

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…The existence of Type II agency problem on family-owned firms affect the flow of information that are allowed to be released by controlling shareholders to the public (Jabeen and Shah, 2011). This is as opposed to the notion that managers are the party that inhibits the flow of information to the public.…”

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is as opposed to the notion that managers are the party that inhibits the flow of information to the public. Jabeen and Shah (2011) explain that in a Type II agency problem, controlling shareholders may reduce or delay the release of information in order to be able to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. This argument is also supported by the findings by Huang and Zhang (2011) that find family firms in China, where Type II agency problems are more prevalent, exhibit lower financial reporting quality.…”

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, Jabeen and Shah (2011) ar-gue that families as controlling shareholders may reduce or delay the release of information in order to be able to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders. This argument is also supported by the findings by Huang and Zhang (2011) that find family firms in China exhibit lower financial reporting quality.…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Crash Risk: Evidence from Indonesian Firms in 2016

Sihombing

Diyanty

2019

JAB

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This research is aimed at investigating whether several dimensions of corporate governance mechanism, namely family ownership, accounting opacity, and Board of Commissioners effectiveness, have effect on one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. Hypothesis test is conducted in 2017 using cross section regression analysis with 277 samples of non-financial firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2016. The result of this research does not show that family ownership and accounting opacity have any effect on firm-specific crash risk. Moreover, the result of this research finds that Board of Commissioners effectiveness has negative effect on firm-specific crash risk. This finding supports the notion that sound corporate governance system increases monitoring activities. This, in turn, decreases the tendency of managers to hide and accumulate bad news from outsiders. Hence, reducing firm-specific crash risk.

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Section: Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cross Section Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Crash Risk: Evidence from Indonesian Firms in 2016

Sihombing

Diyanty

2019

JAB

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The Effect of Family Ownership Concentration, Internet Financial Reporting and Company Sizes on Information Asymmetry

Gunawan

Sabrina

2020

2020 International Conference on Information Management and Technology (ICIMTech)

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Family ownership, information problem and firm performance

Sultana¹

2021

IJRBS

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This paper reviews recent corporate financial literature dealing with family business issues. It discusses research papers that explain the nature and type of agency problems in family firms. It provides empirical evidence of the association of family ownership with information asymmetry. It also portrays the influence of family firms over corporate disclosures. We have analyzed literature to explain the empirical association between family ownership, and so ownership control, and firm performances. This paper also attempts to find out the research gap based on reviewed papers and tries to give the future directions of research in this regard.

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A review on family ownership and information asymmetry

Cited by 6 publications

References 77 publications

Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Crash Risk: Evidence from Indonesian Firms in 2016

Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Crash Risk: Evidence from Indonesian Firms in 2016

The Effect of Family Ownership Concentration, Internet Financial Reporting and Company Sizes on Information Asymmetry

Family ownership, information problem and firm performance

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