A Restatement of Hohfeld

Radin, Max

doi:10.2307/1334102

Cited by 26 publications

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“…Power is the legal ability to do certain acts that alter legal relations, like transferring the ownership of property from one person to another (Radin 1938): “in Hohfeld's terminology any human being who can by his acts produce changes in legal relations has a legal power or powers” (Cook 1919: 725). Consistently, Corbin (1919: 168) defines B's power as the legal relation between B and S when B's own voluntary act will cause new legal relations either between S and B or between S and a third person; that is, “to have power is to have the ability to force another individual into a new legal situation against his or her will” (Bromley 2006: 205).…”

Section: Hohfeld's Jural Lowest Common Denominatormentioning

confidence: 99%

From W. N. Hohfeld to J. R. Commons, and Beyond? A “Law and Economics” Enquiry on Jural Relations

Vatiero

2010

American J Econ Sociol

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In this article we try to reformulate the approaches of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and John Rogers Commons on jural relations speculating on the concept of positionality as introduced by Fred Hirsch in his original work on positional good and competition. Furthermore, by placing Hohfeld's jural lowest common denominator within the Commonsian transaction, we propose a more structured economic description of the jural relations theory. the existence of a marshal implies the existence of a number of soldiers who are not marshals P. H. Wicksteed (1910: 657) *Post-Doc Fellow,

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Section: Hohfeld's Jural Lowest Common Denominatormentioning

confidence: 99%

From W. N. Hohfeld to J. R. Commons, and Beyond? A “Law and Economics” Enquiry on Jural Relations

Vatiero

2010

American J Econ Sociol

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“…These contradictory definitions have led many scholars to refuse to define law altogether and to even regard such a task as almost impossible (Pospisil, 1972). Max Radin (1938Radin ( :1145 exemplifies these pessimistic scholars when he writes: "Those of us who have learned humility have given over the attempts to define law. "…”

Section: A Definition Of the Concept Of Law Is Developed By Drawing Omentioning

confidence: 99%

A Definition of the Concept of Law

Johnson¹

1977

Social Thought and Research

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“…On the definition of claim, seeCook (1919, p. 725),Husik (1924, p. 266),Wellman (1997, p. 76), and Wenar (2015, p. 5). On the definition of privilege, seeHusik (1924, p. 266),Radin (1938Radin ( , p. 1149,Mullock (1970, p. 267),Adams (1985, p. 85),Saunders (1990, p. 468),Wellman (1997, p. 76),Rainbolt (2006, p. 1-2), andWenar (2015, p. 4-5).4 In contemporary discussions, the two authors that are more commonly cited in connection with this principle areKant and Von Wright. In the case of Kant, the principle can be found in the following passages of his work: Critique of Pure Reason (2010, A548/B576, A807/ b835); Critique of PracticalReason (1997, AA 5: 142, 5:143); Metaphysics of Morals (2017, AA 6: 380); Religion within the Boundaries of MereReason (1998, AA 6:47, 6:50, 6: 62, 6: 64); "On the Common Saying: That This May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of no Use in Practice"(2008, AA 8: 276-277, 8: 278-279).…”

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Hohfeld on the duties in privileges and claims

Nascimento

2018

Filosofia Unisinos

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Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld was an American jurist who published a series of articles that were very important for 20 th century analytical philosophy of right. Since they appeared, it has become common to distinguish between four kinds of right, one for each of the four 'Hohfeldian incidents': privileges (or liberties), claims, powers and immunities. Although Hohfeld's theory has drawn much attention, very little of it has been directed to his concept of duty. In this article, I offer a clarification of this concept that takes into account both Hohfeld's original intentions and the new uses that have been made of his theory. In section I, I analyze and clarify the definition of the concept of duty that we find in Hohfeld (1913) to show that it was employed in order to denote a legal obligation and that this use is purely descriptive. In section II, I discuss what kinds of duties may appear as correlatives of privileges and claims inside a Hohfeldian model. In section III, I conclude with a brief summary of the argument.

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A Restatement of Hohfeld

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

From W. N. Hohfeld to J. R. Commons, and Beyond? A “Law and Economics” Enquiry on Jural Relations

From W. N. Hohfeld to J. R. Commons, and Beyond? A “Law and Economics” Enquiry on Jural Relations

A Definition of the Concept of Law

Hohfeld on the duties in privileges and claims

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