A response to Chisholm’s paradox

Bassford, Andrew Dennis

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01238-8

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…The reader might benefit by comparing perdurantism and endurantism to the two dominant positions of identity within possible worlds modal metaphysics, counterpart theory and transworld identity theory, respectively (cf. Lewis 1968, Chisholm 1967, Bassford 2020, Bassford 2021.…”

Section: Perdurantismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics

Bassford

2023

Metaphysica

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This essay offers an original interpretation and defense of the doctrine of flux, as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus. The methodology of the paper’s analysis is in the style of rational reconstruction, and it is highly analytic in scope, in the sense that I will focus on the text itself, and only on certain parts of it too, while ignoring the rest of Plato’s extensive corpus, and without worrying about whether, how, and to what extent the interpretation of the view coheres well with the other elements of the secret doctrine view discussed in the dialogue, as well. In the first part of the essay, I’ll offer my interpretation of the doctrine. Then, in the second part of the essay, I’ll examine two potential criticisms of the doctrine, including Socrates’s infamous linguistic paradox, and show how my interpretation of Heraclitean flux metaphysics is able to circumvent both.

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Section: Perdurantismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics

Bassford

2023

Metaphysica

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“…We'll need to stipulate it because, like 'property,' no general consensus on the meaning of 'essence' has been reached in contemporary discussion. As we use the term throughout this essay, we mean only to designate qualitative necessary-for-existence conditions, or what is normally just referred to as the 'essential properties' of the phenomenon under investigation (Plantinga 1970, 474;Robertson and Atkins 2018;Bassford 2019). This kind of essence differs from what Roca-Royes (2011) refers to as 'sufficient for existence' essences.…”

Section: 'Essence'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Bassford

Dolson

2021

Inquiry

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Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or features) for their existence. We call those who suppose they do 'property essentialists'; those who do not, 'property anti-essentialists,' or 'quidditists.' We offer two complementary arguments. Our total argument is under-girded by two assumptions: transworld identity theory and 'received view' counterfactual semantics, a la David Lewis. We then argue that, if one presumes that these are true, then one risks running headlong into paradox if one also accepts property anti-essentialism. That's the first argument. By contrast, if one accepts these same assumptions in conjunction with property essentialism, then the paradox is avoided. This is the second argument. We take it that our arguments work to show that, between property essentialism and quidditism, the property essentialist is on better footing. Plausibly, properties themselves do have essential properties for their existence.

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Two morals about a modal paradox

Roberts

2020

Synthese

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Chisholm's paradox serves as an important constraint on our modal theorising. For example, one lesson of the paradox is that widely accepted essentialist theses appear incompatible with metaphysical necessity obeying a logic that includes S4. However, this article cautions against treating Chisholm's paradox in isolation, as a single line of reasoning. To this end, the article outlines two crucial morals about Chisholm's paradox which situate the paradox within a broad family of paradoxes. Each moral places significant constraints on the paradox's solution space. In light of this perspective, the paper applies the two morals to a recently proposed solution to Chisholm's Paradox by Benj Hellie, Murray and Wilson (in: Bennett and Zimmerman (eds) Oxford studies in metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012). Keywords Metaphysical modality • Chisholm's Paradox • Modal logic • Relativised metaphysical modalityChisholm's Paradox serves as an important constraint on our modal theorising. 1 In response to the paradox, Nathan Salmon (1986, 1989) has proposed that S4 is not a lower bound on the logic of metaphysical necessity. Others, such as Chisholm (1967) himself, have adopted an extremely stringent form of essentialism. More recently, Benj Hellie, Adam Murray, and Jessica Wilson (2012; forthcoming) have developed an interesting view of relativised metaphysical necessity according to which metaphysical necessity exhibits a distinctive type of relativity.The purpose of this article is to emphasise, bolster, and apply two important morals about Chisholm's Paradox. Each moral places significant constraints on the paradox's solution space. The moral of equivalence is that in certain systems of modal logic Chisholm's Paradox is a mere logical variant of a paradox involving no iterated necessity claims. This moral was first noticed by Graeme Forbes (1984, pp. 172-173);

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A response to Chisholm’s paradox

Cited by 4 publications

References 18 publications

Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics

Heraclitean Flux Metaphysics

Counterfactual similarity, nomic indiscernibility, and the paradox of quidditism

Two morals about a modal paradox

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