A Response by Professor Dukeminier

Dukeminier, Jesse

doi:10.2307/1122416

Cited by 19 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…Metes refer to a boundary defined by direction and distance between terminal points. Bounds refer to local boundary descriptions.3 We find no legal or economic scholarship on this topic, and even major property law treatises (e.g.,Dukeminier and Krier 2002;Merrill and Smith 2007) merely describe the American RS.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions

Libecap

Lueck

2011

Journal of Political Economy

154

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We use a natural experiment in nineteenth-century Ohio to analyze the economic effects of two dominant land demarcation regimes, metes and bounds (MB) and the rectangular system (RS). MB is decentralized with plot shapes, alignment, and sizes defined individually; RS is a centralized grid of uniform square plots that does not vary with topography. We find large initial net benefits in land values from the RS and also that these effects persist into the twenty-first century. These findings reveal the importance of transaction costs and networks in affecting property rights, land values, markets, and economic growth.

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions

Libecap

Lueck

2011

Journal of Political Economy

154

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“…208 As stated above, children generally have no right to inherit anything from their parents. 209 However, under the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"), several statutes provide protection to minors' inheritance. The UPC is a "model statute that modernizes the doctrines governing intestate succession, probate, and the administration of estates."…”

Section: A Minorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Is the Next Step for Companion Pets in the Legal System?

Simmons

2013

Tex. A&M L. Rev.

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The relationship between human beings and companion pets is changing. For purposes of this Comment, companion pets are the dogs and cats that people share their homes with. Today, more households have a dog or cat than children. Despite the social changes, companion pets are still classified as property. At some point in history, minors, women, and slaves were also classified as property. Through social revolutions, such as the Civil War, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Women’s Rights Movement, property classification for humans was dismantled. This Comment discusses the progression of minors’ rights and protections and how companion pets have gained similar rights and protections in various areas of the law. However, despite the increase in rights, companion pets still lack the ability to have status or standing in the legal system for the protection or promotion of their interests. Minors also do not have the ability to sue or be sued. Nevertheless, a guardianship system has developed in order to protect minors’ interest until the minors reach the age of majority. Guardians have certain duties and responsibility to minors. Owners of companion pets are not considered guardians, and courts do not appoint guardians; thus, those duties and responsibilities that protect minors do not apply to companion pets. In conclusion, this Comment argues that the next logical step for increasing the rights of companion pets is to establish a guardianship system similar to the system for minors.

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“…275 Thus the leading casebook offers the example of a "nineteenth-century trust to care for old horses retired from pulling fire wagons and streetcars" as a good candidate for cy pres. 276 Recently, however, there has been a movement to broaden the grounds for cy pres to include "wasteful." The idea is to account for "the increasingly frequent problem of trust funds that have become excessive for their stated charitable purpose."…”

Section: A Charitable Trustsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off

Sitkoff

Klick

2007

SSRN Journal

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In July of 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust's investment portfolio by selling the Trust's controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company's stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania attorney general, who was then running for governor, brought suit to stop the sale on the grounds that it would harm the central Pennsylvania community. In September 2002, after the attorney general obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company's stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study econometric analysis, we find that the sale announcement was associated with a positive abnormal return of over 25 percent and that canceling the sale was followed by a negative abnormal return of nearly 12 percent. Our findings imply that instead of improving the welfare of the needy children who are the Trust's main beneficiaries, the attorney general's intervention preserved charitable trust agency costs on the order of roughly $850 million and prevented the Trust from achieving salutary portfolio diversification. Overall, blocking the sale destroyed roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth, reducing aggregate social welfare by preserving a suboptimal ownership structure of the Hershey Company. Our findings contribute to the literature of trust law by supplying the first empirical analysis of agency costs in the charitable trust form and by highlighting shortcomings in supervision of charitable entities by the state attorneys general. Our findings also contribute to the literature of corporate governance by measuring the difference in firm value when the Hershey Company was subject to a takeover versus under the control of a controlling shareholder. 1 This impressive figure speaks to the American impulse toward philanthropy. 2 But the ugly secret about charitable organizations is that their lack of a clearly defined owner invites deadweight losses arising from agency costs. True, the state attorneys general have formal authority to ensure that the managers of such organizations efficiently pursue a bona fide charitable purpose. In reality, however, the typical state attorney general is an elected political official for whom the supervision of charitable organizations has little political payoff. Accordingly, scholars tend to assume the existence of significant agency costs in charitable trusts and other charitable organizations. 3 A separate agency problem arises in the context of the public corporation. Here the concern is that the interests of the company's managers will diverge from those of the shareholders. To align the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders, the law gives shareholders various rights, including the right to sell their shares, which invites a takeover bid if the company's current management yields inferior returns. An alternative mechanism for minimizing corporate agency costs arises when the firm has a controlling shareholder or ...

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A Response by Professor Dukeminier

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions

The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions

What Is the Next Step for Companion Pets in the Legal System?

Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off

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