A resilient buffer allocation scheme in active queue management: a stochastic cooperative game theoretic approach

Halim

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

2016

Providing congestion control in the Internet, while ensuring fairness among myriad of heterogeneous flows is a challenging task. The conventional wisdom is to rely on end-user applications cooperatively deploying congestion control mechanisms to achieve high network utilization and some degree of fairness among flows. However, as the Internet has evolved to encompass all of society, such a cooperative behavior from enduser applications is not always granted. Applications may simply act selfishly to be more competitive through bandwidth abuse. Bandwidth starvation may also arise unintentionally depending on the nature of traffic sources. The ensuing impact can be severe fairness hazard and even congestion collapse. Router-based queue management schemes driven by fairness objectives thus become an inescapable necessity for fairly sharing network resources.Given a significant volume of literature relating to fairnessdriven queue management schemes, there has remained a need for a broader and coherent survey. This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive review of eminent fairness-driven queue management schemes from the inception of the concept and the preliminary work to the most recent work. We present a new taxonomy of categorizing fairness-driven queue management schemes. We discuss design approaches and key attributes of these schemes and provide their comparison and analysis. Based on the outcomes of this survey, we discuss a number of open issues and provide generic design guidelines and future directions for the research in this field. Fairness-Driven Queue Management: A Survey and Taxonomy 2 c packets/s Scheduling algorithm Dequeueend B packets Buffer k l 1 l Enqueueend Output link Input links Queue management algorithm mechanisms at all, either deliberately or by accident, and generate misbehaving traffic [9]. Furthermore, there are applications that selfishly improve throughput by splitting a single TCP connection into multiple connections [10], [3]. All such applications and the resulting traffic aggregates are potentially dangerous as they inflict unfairness in the network, and can eventually cause congestion collapse [9], [11].In response to these problems, there has been a long history, dating back to [12], of realizing that routers play a significant role in fair bandwidth allocation. The technical report by Floyd and Fall [13] (later published as [3]) is, however, the first one to extensively demonstrate the danger of unfairness due to unresponsive flows. Floyd and Fall [13] argue that the incentives for cooperative behavior can only come from the network itself, and therefore, routers inevitably need to deploy mechanisms to provide an incentive structure for applications to use end-to-end congestion control. The report also proposes queue management based techniques for identifying and restricting unresponsive flows. Since then, a number of fairness-driven queue management schemes have been proposed to shield responsive flows and to regulate unresponsive and aggressive flows.This paper provid...

Section: Prior-core-based Buffer Allocation (Pcba)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Prior-core-based Buffer Allocation (Pcba)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness-Driven Queue Management: A Survey and Taxonomy

Halim

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

2016

“…[14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22]), and stateful (e.g. [23][24][25][26][27][28]) schemes. However, few, if any, of the fairness-driven AQM schemes have ever been implemented.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ARCH: A dual‐mode fairness‐driven AQM for promoting cooperative behaviour in best effort Internet

et al. 2019

The cooperative behaviour of end-systems in efficiently and fairly utilizing the scarce bandwidth is of paramount significance in the best effort Internet. Not only does the uncooperative behaviour result in unfairness, but it may also induce congestion collapse. How to urge end-systems to share the bandwidth cooperatively is a problem that depends, in essence, on incentives. This study presents a novel fairness-driven active queue management (AQM)-based incentive scheme to detect and take punitive action against any uncooperative behaviour. Different from all other fairness-driven AQM schemes, the proposed scheme offers a dual-mode control function that can adaptively switch between stateless and partial-state modes in order to be scalable. The control function remains stateless at low to moderate congestion levels and maintains a partial-state when congestion becomes severe. In the stateless mode, the identification and restriction of unresponsive flows are based on a matched-drop mechanism having a dynamic drawing factor to differentially drop packets from unresponsive flows. In the partialstate mode, a fair-share is estimated and flows whose arrival rates exceed the fair-share bandwidth get their rates limited to the fair rate. Simulation results demonstrate the reasonable performance improvement of the proposed scheme over well-known fairness-driven AQM schemes.

“…That is the approach taken in [17], where a cooperative game is developed and where the payoffs obtained by cooperation are described by stochastic variables. That is the approach taken in [17], where a cooperative game is developed and where the payoffs obtained by cooperation are described by stochastic variables.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When discussing fairness in resource allocation, one possible strategy is to enforce such fairness by applying queueing mechanisms and rules. That is the approach taken in [17], where a cooperative game is developed and where the payoffs obtained by cooperation are described by stochastic variables.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Repeated game theory as a framework for algorithm development in communication networks

Coimbra

Correia

2015

Int J Communication

This article presents a tutorial on how to use repeated game theory as a framework for algorithm development in communication networks. The article starts by introducing the basis of one-stage games and how the outcome of such games can be predicted, through iterative elimination and Nash equilibrium. In communication networks, however, not all problems can be modeled using one-stage games. Some problems can be better modeled through multi-stage games, as many problems in communication networks consist of several iterations or decisions that need to be made over time. Of all the multi-stage games, the infinite-horizon repeated games were chosen to be the focus in this tutorial, because optimal equilibrium settings can be achieved, contrarily to the suboptimal equilibria achieved in other types of game. With the theoretical concepts introduced, it is then shown how the developed game theoretical model, and devised equilibrium, can be used as a basis for the behavior of an algorithm, which is supposed to solve a particular problem and will be running at specific network devices.of 18 ‡ The symbol 0 0 represents the Cartesian product. Hence, i 2P S i D ® s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s jPj js 1 2 S 1^s2 2 S 2^: : :ŝ jPj 2 S jPj¯.of 18 4