2019
DOI: 10.1111/rego.12290
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

A reputation for what, to whom, and in which task environment: A commentary

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
34
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 19 publications
(34 citation statements)
references
References 54 publications
(90 reference statements)
0
34
0
Order By: Relevance
“…A regulatory agency is more likely to respond to negative public judgments or mixed, both positive and negative, public judgments. Following up on recent empirical studies that analyze reputation as a multi-dimensional concept (Capelos et al 2016;Christensen & Lodge 2018;Busuioc & Rimkutė 2020;Rimkutė 2020a;Boon et al 2021), we expected patterned responses, according to the reputational dimension, targeted by public judgments. Those studies draw upon Carpenter's (2010b) four reputational dimensions that regulatory agencies may choose to cultivate.…”
Section: Theorizing Regulatory Agencies' Communicative Responses To R...mentioning
confidence: 97%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…A regulatory agency is more likely to respond to negative public judgments or mixed, both positive and negative, public judgments. Following up on recent empirical studies that analyze reputation as a multi-dimensional concept (Capelos et al 2016;Christensen & Lodge 2018;Busuioc & Rimkutė 2020;Rimkutė 2020a;Boon et al 2021), we expected patterned responses, according to the reputational dimension, targeted by public judgments. Those studies draw upon Carpenter's (2010b) four reputational dimensions that regulatory agencies may choose to cultivate.…”
Section: Theorizing Regulatory Agencies' Communicative Responses To R...mentioning
confidence: 97%
“…We hypothesized that a regulator's inclination to respond to public judgments depends on whether judgments address reputational dimensions which are central (or peripheral) to its mission and whether the regulator's reputation is strong (or weak) for those dimensions. We thereby respond to a recent call for more empirical research that addresses the implications of the multi-dimensional nature of bureaucratic reputation head-on (Boon et al 2021). In addition, we theorized that a regulator's inclination to respond to public judgments depends on the audience that criticizes or endorses the regulator .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Regarding the attribution of blame and credit, the higher the risk of blame following the collaboration's actions, the higher the propensity for blame and thus for blame avoidance behavior, and vice versa for credit and credit claiming behavior. Some characteristics and outcomes of interagency collaborations may matter to heterogeneous audiences and stakeholders because they can affect their safety, well-being, and other aspects and dimensions of their lives or business operations (e.g., van der Veer 2021; Carpenter and Krause 2012;Etienne 2015;Maor 2016b;Boon, Salomonsen, and Verhoest 2021;Capelos 2016). Among the key characteristics that audiences may care about are perceptions of mutual understanding amongst partners involved in interagency collaboration; effectiveness of collaboration, particularly in areas related to the most serious threats to the public; intensity of interaction; flexibility of interaction; speed of learning; as well as perceptions of synergy among the activities of collaborating agencies.…”
Section: Analytical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, numerous studies in this field are driven by the idea that “[…] when trying to account for a regulator’s behavior,” we should “ look at the audience , and look at the threats ” (Carpenter 2010b, 832; italics in original ). Scholars claim that agency reputation-management strategies vary according to the number of reputational threats arising due to conflicting audience assessments vis-à-vis the agency’s end products, procedures, and performance (Carpenter 2010a; Carpenter and Krause 2012; 2015; Boon, Salomonsen, and Verhoest 2021; for a review, see Perez 2021). Potential sources of threats in risk regulation regimes (Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin 2001; Rothstein 2003; Rothstein, Borraz, and Huber 2012) include the disparity between an agency’s policy conduct and reputation, low levels of organizational conduct (e.g., subunits fail to coordinate satisfactorily), and shifting expectations among the agency’s audiences regarding the agency or the sector within which it operates.…”
Section: Relevant Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…We call for more research into (1) the impact of reputation on political control and practices of democratic accountability, (2) the role of audiences in this respect, (3) the composition and representativeness of coalitions of esteem, and (4) the impact of informal reputation‐building on the structure and strategy of political control as well as how these might vary across institutional contexts or task environments (see Boon, Salomonsen, and Verhoest 2019). Reputation‐building as a practice of legitimation is often discussed in terms of its positive effects (e.g., Moffitt 2010, 2014), or as an additional obligation that organizations take on to mitigate or to remedy deficits owing to existing hierarchical arrangements (Schillemans 2008).…”
Section: Conclusion: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?mentioning
confidence: 99%