A Relational Framework for Analyzing Ventures in Cognitive Environments: Illustrations from the TNK-BP Experience

Artificial intelligence and the fifth phase of political risk management: An application to regulatory expropriation

“…The TNK‐BP joint venture could be thought of as the perfect reason for a joint venture or a perfect storm of challenges waiting to happen. TNK (Tyumen Oil) was controlled by the AAR (Alfa Group, Access Industries, and Renova) consortium, which is, respectively, owned by three Russian oligarchs (Mikhail Friedman, Len Blavatnik, and Victor Vekselberg), whereas BP was a western firm and the world's third‐largest oil company, when the roughly $7 billion merger was announced in 2003 (Kyj & Kyj, 2010). At the time, BP was seeking to expand its assets and options internationally and this occurred during a period of consolidation in the oil industry.…”

“…At the time, BP was seeking to expand its assets and options internationally and this occurred during a period of consolidation in the oil industry. TNK, on the other hand, hoped to benefit from the technical expertise of BP allowing for further expansion of fields and gains in efficiencies that would likely emerge (Kyj & Kyj, 2010). Tyumen also had shared oil field rights with Sidanko, another Russian company and project in which BP had purchased a 10% stake (Kyj & Kyj, 2010).…”

“…TNK, on the other hand, hoped to benefit from the technical expertise of BP allowing for further expansion of fields and gains in efficiencies that would likely emerge (Kyj & Kyj, 2010). Tyumen also had shared oil field rights with Sidanko, another Russian company and project in which BP had purchased a 10% stake (Kyj & Kyj, 2010). Ironically, BP may have seen this as an opportunity to reduce political risk by partnering with two Russian companies, but may have missed the fact the Tyumen had been sued by a Canadian company for failing to meet its obligations in another JV (Feils & Sabac, 2000).…”

“…While in theory the JV was set to be an equal partnership, both TNK and BP having 50% ownership and each appointing five members to the board of directors, each may have had divergent needs and goals (Kyj & Kyj, 2010). Of course, BP wanted to gain access to Russian oil fields and had longer‐term development aspirations that required more investment and slower returns and was even willing to assume some of the liabilities of TNK companies associated with environmental remediation from previous issues, but TNK had a shorter‐term profit horizon (Kyj & Kyj, 2010) and goals for the venture. Ironically, BP's own environmental issues with the Macondo (Prospect), Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, required roughly $30 billion cash for settlements and pushed TNK‐BP to buy BP assets in Venezuela and Vietnam, for market expansion (BP/TNK‐BP, 2010).…”

Introduction: can Russia and its oil companies handle change?

“…These relationships serve as an important interface between Russia and the world. They have sometimes been characterized by conflict and trouble, as in the relationship between BP and Gazprom over the Kovykta gas field in Siberia or between Shell and Gazprom in the areas off Sakhalin Island (Henderson and Moe 2016;Kyj and Kyj 2010;Locatelli 2006;Sevastyanov 2008). Partly because of such past quarrels and partly because of the Western sanctions against Russia, there has been a shift away from partnerships with Western companies to Chinese and other Asian oil companies (Overland and Kubayeva 2018).…”