“…Theoretical objections to hypothetical constructs (Skinner, 1974), a preference for functional (i.e., in terms of environment-behavior relationships) accounts, as well as an apparent difficulty in accounting for the generativity of language and cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), are often employed to support the argument that a behavioristic account of intelligence is not only difficult technically, but inappropriate conceptually. However, recent advances in a behavior-analytic account of language and cognition, known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al, 2001; see also Dymond & Roche, 2013) have led to new insights into how we might conceive intellectual behavior in a non-mentalistic manner (e.g., Hayes, 1994;O'Hora, Pelaez, & Barnes-Holmes, 2005; O'Toole, Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, O'Connor, & Barnes-Holmes, 2009;Smith, Smith, Taylor, & Hobby, 2005) as well as the development of intervention protocols that have shown early promise in increasing intelligence quotients (Cassidy, Roche, Colbert, Stewart, & Grey, 2016;Cassidy, Roche, & Hayes, 2011;Dixon, Whiting, Rowsey, & Belisly, 2014;Moran, Stewart, McElwee, & Ming, 2010). As such, RFT-inspired measures are increasingly being looked upon within the behavior-analytic community as conceptually-sound proxies for IQ with acceptable construct validity.…”