A Rejoinder to Perrow

Porte, Todd R. La; Rochlin, Gene I.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5973.1994.tb00047.x

Cited by 67 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Research on 'high reliability organizations' (HROs), organizations 'that behave under very trying conditions ' (LaPorte & Rochlin, 1994: 221) such as nuclear power plants, air traffic control systems, and incident command teams, demonstrates how organizations that must function reliably are able to do so in spite of risky technologies, complexity and uncertain environments (Rochlin et al, 1987;Shulman, 1993;Weick & Roberts, 1993;Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These organizations are unique in their abilities both to prevent and to manage mishaps before they can spread throughout the system causing widespread damage or failure.…”

Section: The Systems View Of Organizational Safetymentioning

confidence: 99%

Overcoming dysfunctional momentum: Organizational safety as a social achievement

2009

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Research on organizational safety and reliability largely has emphasized system-level structures and processes neglecting the more micro-level, social processes necessary to enact organizational safety. In this qualitative study we remedy this gap by exploring these processes in the context of wildland fire management. In particular, using interview data gathered from 28 individuals involved in wildland firefighting, we explore the validity of the idea that a deterrent to organizational safety is an inability to redirect ongoing actions once they are underway. The findings suggest four major themes. First, individuals and groups redirect ongoing action as a result of re-evaluating that action. Second, noticing early warning signs, while necessary, is not sufficient to drive change. Third, two social processes -giving voice to concerns and actively seeking alternative perspectives -appear to be key drivers of re-evaluation. Fourth, the process of redirecting action is moderated by two social factors: institutional pressures and self-interest. We discuss the implications of these patterns for organization theory and for future research.

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Section: The Systems View Of Organizational Safetymentioning

confidence: 99%

Overcoming dysfunctional momentum: Organizational safety as a social achievement

2009

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“…Such a view, as La Porte and Rochlin (1994) correctly point out, largely ignores the shared nature of culture and through this the ways in which members internalize organizational goals while retaining a local radius of action. Sagan also claims that a hierarchical culture of reliability is impractical for many organizations (outside the military at least) in that it is incompatible with wider democratic values.…”

Section: High Reliability Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The Limits to Safety? Culture, Politics, Learning and Man–Made Disasters

Pidgeon

1997

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

107

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Three interrelated questions are posed. First, what is the significance of culture for theories of institutional resilience and vulnerability? Second, what are the cultural possibilities for organizational safety and learning? Third, can a theory of institutional vulnerability to disaster and crisis be translated into one of practical resilience? The paper explores these issues with reference to Barry Turner's seminal Man-Made Disasters model of system vulnerability together with more recent extensions and critiques.Attempts to move from this framework to a theoretical characterization of the`safe' organization are outlined, as is parallel research on high reliability organizations. Critique of this work in the debate over the limits to safety in complex organizations has focused in particular upon the political processes which corrupt possibilities for organizational learning. It is argued that such political problems, and in particular that of blame in organizations, ultimately require political solutions. Examples are given of solutions in aviation monitoring systems.

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“…Normal accident theory proposes that because these production systems are technologically complex, highly interdependent, and opaque, seemingly small technical troubles and subtle organizational politics will inevitably accumulate to overwhelm the capacities of risk handlers, and accidents or serious near accidents will occur (Perrow, 1984(Perrow, , 1994a(Perrow, , 1994bSagan, 1993Sagan, , 1994. High-reliability theory, recognizing the successes of risk handling, aims to explain the sociological, political, and cognitive capacities of high-hazard organizations to avoid mishaps (LaPorte, 1994b;LaPorte & Consolini, 1991;LaPorte, Roberts, & Rochlin, 1989; LaPorte & Rochlin, 1994;Rochlin, 1993). The vignette illustrates the premises of each theory in that, given &dquo;tight couplings&dquo; and system complexities, one incident challenged ultimate safeguards and thereby introduced new complications, but the compensatory activities of risk handlers prevented untoward consequences.…”

Section: Risk Estimation and Risk Handlingmentioning

confidence: 97%

Organizations as Contexts: Implications for Safety Science and Practice

Perin

1995

Industrial & Environmental Crisis Quarterly

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A theory of organizations as contexts frames the kinds of objective and subjective evidence needed for systematic analyses of the conditions under which accidents and incidents occur, are recovered from, or are prevented. Contexts of risk-handling activities in high-hazard production systems are seen as supraindividual and self-governing entities, structured by social and cultural properties such as goals, resources, communication, meanings and categories, and intercontext relationships. The concept of self-governance equalizes the importance of lateral and executive control for safety management. Actors' access to and degree of perceived and objective control over resources become significant data, as do data relating to communicative, cultural, and coordination issues. Context theory highlights several issues in safety research and practice and organizational studies generally, and it suggests new approaches to incident investigations and organizational learning.My aim in this article is to identify the kinds of evidence needed for explaining actors' responses to safety-threatening events organizationally and systematically The context theory I outline views organizations as constituted by intersecting, overlapping, and interacting contexts of risk-handling activities structured by global and local social and cultural practices. I conclude by exploring the implications of this theory for safety research and practice and for organizational studies generally.

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A Rejoinder to Perrow

Cited by 67 publications

References 11 publications

Overcoming dysfunctional momentum: Organizational safety as a social achievement

Overcoming dysfunctional momentum: Organizational safety as a social achievement

The Limits to Safety? Culture, Politics, Learning and Man–Made Disasters

Organizations as Contexts: Implications for Safety Science and Practice

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