A Reformed Division of Labor for the Science of Well-Being

Abstract

This paper provides a philosophical assessment of leading theory-based, evidence-based and coherentist approaches to the definition and the measurement of well-being. It then builds on this assessment to articulate a reformed division of labor for the science of well-being and argues that this reformed division of labor can improve on the proffered approaches by combining the most plausible tenets of theory-based approaches with the most plausible tenets of coherentist approaches. This result does not per se exclude the possibility that theory-based and coherentist approaches may be independently improved or amended in the years to come. Still, together with the challenges that affect these approaches, it strengthens the case for combining the most plausible tenets of those approaches.

Measurement Scepticism, Construct Validation, and Methodology of Well-Being Theorising

“…Hersch (2022: part 3) and Alexandrova (2017) share the impression that a significant number of (moral) philosophers endorse some form of methodological nonnaturalism with regards to characterising well-being theories. See also Fumagalli's discussion of what he calls 'theory-based approaches' (Fumagalli 2022).…”

“…Such a sceptical attitude about the measurability of well-being has some intuitive appeal and is frequently encountered in public debates. 2 More importantly, in the philosophical literature on well-being, problems connected to measuring well-being are a prominent theme (Angner 2010;2013b;Fumagalli 2022;Hausman 2011: 7;Haybron 2020;Ingelström & van der Deijl 2021;Taylor 2015;van der Deijl 2017a).…”

“…Here is a list of some of the problems (the list is not supposed to be exhaustive and the items might be partly overlapping). First, a number of researchers have pointed out that the scores of measurement instruments often diverge (Fumagalli 2022). That is, measures of well-being can vary significantly depending on the type of measurement instrument or scale.…”

“…. For instance,Hassoun (2019) andFumagalli (2022) would most likely raise concerns about this coherentist spirit of theory-revision.…”

Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics

“…what is non-instrumentally good for individuals (e.g. Griffin 1986: part I; Fumagalli 2022) – as opposed to other kinds of value (e.g. Sumner 1996: Ch.…”