A Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence

Abstract

The distinction between general and specific deterrence is widely recognized and accepted by deterrence researchers, and is used commonly to classify deterrence studies. However, the logical and empirical grounds for the distinction are not as clear as they might appear, and the conventional conception has done more to obfuscate than to clarify the deterrence process. Following a discussion of these issues, the authors propose a reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence, and apply it to several current controversies in the deterrence literature.

Deterring Defiance: 'Don’t Give a Poacher a Reason to Poach'

“…Discretion depends on a number of factors, and the consequences for using too much or too little discretion are largely unknown. After receiving a warning or a summons, the incident can have three effects; create compliance, defiance, or have no impact (Stafford and Warr 1993). For poachers in this study, the determination of unfair treatment encourages defiance.…”

“…First, general deterrence or one's indirect experience with punishment means the knowledge that some people are punished will deter the general population from illegal activity; second, specific deterrence deals with one's direct experience with crime and punishment, meaning individuals are punished for a crime they commit and it deters them from future crime (Stafford & Warr 1993). The certainty of punishment or one's ability to avoid punishment (punishment avoidance) may influence one's decision to commit crimes.…”

“…Deterrence theory argues, when a person's perceived level of punishment avoidance is high, one believes getting away with a crime is more likely; therefore, one is more apt to deviate because the evidence suggests direct punishment is unlikely. Therefore, punishment avoidance may become more influential for encouraging future crime, than punishment is for discouraging it (Stafford & Warr 1993). Other evidence suggests that punishment further increases the likelihood of crime (Piquero & Pogarsky 2002), meaning punishments may create defiance.…”

“…While reintegrative sanctions may create a deterrent effect, disintegrative sanctions may produce defiance by stigmatizing the offender, and weakening social bonds with the community (Hirschi 1969); weaker bonds thereby make it easier to neutralize illegal behavior (Sykes & Matza 1957). Therefore, the sanction does not have the effect of direct deterrence as suggested by Stafford & Warr (1993); rather, the punishment increases the likelihood of future crime (Piquero & Pogarsky 2002). The final element, procedural justice, is a matter of treating offenders (or suspects) with dignity and respect (Tyler 1990).…”

“…When asked how to prevent or deter fish and wildlife violations, most poachers overwhelmingly suggest pro-criminal justice solutions. The budgetary constraints of the Maine Warden Service concerned poachers, and the paucity of game wardens in the field contributed to heightened punishment avoidance levels (Stafford & Warr 1993). The reactive law enforcement strategy of waiting for someone to commit a crime, rather than proactively preventing it through visibility concerns poachers.…”