A reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt.

Abstract

Approximately 100 years ago, in an era of intellectual ferment, events of marked consequence took place in the history of psychology. It was in the decade of the 1870s that the first handbook of experimental psychology appeared, followed soon by the founding of the first formal laboratory of experimental psychology. Both were the achievements of Wilhelm Wundt, ever since recognized as experimental psychology's great patron, though later barred from any role that might remotely resemble sainthood. Soon after the wave of "new" psychologists spread out from Wundt's laboratory, a series of intellectual revolutions largely erased from memory the content of Wundtian psychological theory. Now that the movement set in motion by Wundt has come through its first century, it would seem fitting to mark the centenary by briefly turning back, reexamining psychology's historical foundations, and paying homage to the founding father. There is, however, another reason for re-This article is a revised and expanded version of a talk presented to the New York Academy of Sciences, New

On making sense. An exploration of Wundt’s apperceptionist account of meaningful speech

“…With regard to (a), it has already been noted that Wundt defined consciousness as an organized (or synthetic) whole of interconnected processes. The functional organization of the processes of consciousness around motives by virtue of apperception prevents an atomist conception of the mind as a “mere field of billiard balls colliding and interacting with each other” as endorsed by Herbart for example (Blumenthal, , p. 1083) . As such, the unity of consciousness, according to Wundt, derives from its volitional structure, by virtue of which “the relation of the single factors to one another is regarded as an interconnection of means which has for the end aimed at, the product arising from the interconnection” (Wundt, , p. 327).…”

“…In the wake of this critical reorientation in the historiography of psychology, the standard (Titcherian) structuralist and positivist interpretation of Wilhelm Wundt’s work was successfully challenged by a number of scholars. As noted by Blumenthal () and Danziger (), Wundt’s students (and most notably Titchener) played an important role in the development and dissemination of this one‐sided, flawed reception of Wundt’s work. Both Blumenthal (, , ) and Danziger (, 1990, , ), as well as Leary (), Van Rappard () and more recently Araujo (), should be credited with unearthing the intellectual and philosophical background of Wundt’s work, and presenting a more sophisticated, fine‐grained analysis of his psychological voluntarism.…”

“…As noted by Blumenthal () and Danziger (), Wundt’s students (and most notably Titchener) played an important role in the development and dissemination of this one‐sided, flawed reception of Wundt’s work. Both Blumenthal (, , ) and Danziger (, 1990, , ), as well as Leary (), Van Rappard () and more recently Araujo (), should be credited with unearthing the intellectual and philosophical background of Wundt’s work, and presenting a more sophisticated, fine‐grained analysis of his psychological voluntarism. In doing so, a more balanced perspective on Wundt’s work emerged that does justice to both “Wundt the theorist” and to his widely acknowledged role as the “father of experimental psychology.” A more thorough grasp of the depth structure of Wundt’s psychology not only allows for a better grasp of the theoretical background of Wundt’s experimental practice (Danziger, , p. 96), it furthermore enables one to appreciate the philosophical purport of his psychological system.…”

When a clear strong voice was needed: A retrospective review of Watson's (1924/1930) behaviorism

“…If Watson had read the original works of Wundt or of G. E. Müller, he would have seen that, occasional references to consciousness aside, much of their research was as objective as his and that he had focused too narrowly on the work of Titchener, Ladd, and others who had translated Wundt to jibe with their preferences. This inadvertent or intentional bias was not publicized until the 1970s, when researchers like Blumenthal () and Danziger (e.g., ) helped celebrate the centennial of the first publication from Wundt's Leipzig lab in 1879. They showed that Wundt strongly opposed introspective reports and that his methods were objective, but he did believe in consciousness as a part of the subject matter of psychology, as did (and does) almost everyone.…”

The Visual Guide to Morality: Vision as an Integrative Analogy for Moral Experience, Variability and Mechanism

“…Analogies have long played a central role in the development of scientific theory and its dissemination (Glucksberg & Keysar, ). In psychology, prominent analogies include Wundt's comparison of psychology to chemistry (Blumenthal, ) and Freud's model of the unconscious as an iceberg. Within moral psychology, the mind has been analogized as a camera with easy automatic settings (i.e., emotion) and more difficult manual settings (i.e., cognition; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, ; Greene, 2014), and to an elephant (i.e., emotion) with a rider (i.e., cognition; Haidt, ) who erroneously believes herself to be in control.…”