A reactor-level analysis of busbar costs for US nuclear plants, 1970–2005

A reply to “Historical construction costs of global nuclear power reactors”

“…Koomey and Hultman (2007) discussed the distinction (first raised by Nemet (2007)) of returns to unit scale (as in nuclear reactors) versus returns to manufacturing scale (as in solar PV and wind power). It has become clear in 8 recent years that, at least for the current state of nuclear and renewable technologies, the second effect is far more powerful than the first.…”

“…In that article, the authors purport to show that using this larger data set yields different and more accurate results than analyses that focus on individual countries, explicitly citing Koomey and Hultman (2007) for the United States and Grubler (2010) for France as examples of country-level treatments.…”

The French Pressurised Water Reactor Programme

“…Cost projections of novel technologies are an inherent element in any climate change policy analysis. This case study has reconfirmed the conclusion of Koomey and Hultman (2007) that projections of the future need to be grounded much more firmly within the historical observational space, requiring much more careful arguments and logic in scenario design and model runs before suggesting "robust" or "optimal" climate stabilization pathways. Again, agreeing with Koomey and Hultman (2007) detailed justification needs to be provided if assumptions differ radically from historical experience.…”

“…This cost escalation, although significantly below that experienced in other countries, most notably the US (cf. Koomey and Hultman, 2007), is far above what would be expected just from longer construction times. The reasons for cost escalation await further detailed research, but have been already alluded to above: loss of the costdampening effects from standardization, partly due to up-scaling to 1300 MW, but especially in the "frenchifying" of the tested Westinghouse design (as evidenced in the differences between the P4 and the P'4 reactor series); a certain "stretching" in the construction schedules after 1981 to maintain human and industrial intellectual capital during the significant scale-back of the expansion program as a result of built overcapacity); and above all, the unsuccessful attempt towards the end of the program to introduce a radically new, entirely French design, the P4 reactor (the precursor to the current European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) design) that did not allow any learning spillovers in design or construction.…”

“…The single, most noticed measure of success in the French nuclear scale-up is undeniably the construction times from construction start to first grid connection (see Table 1) and which are short by international standards. While a certain increase across the various successive reactor generations built is evident from the data (IAEA, 2012), particularly for the later P'4 and especially the N4 reactor types, Koomey and Hultman (2007). About half of the French reactors -55% of reactors and 47% of total gross capacity added -have construction times of less than 72 months (6 years); around three quarters -76% of reactors, 70% of gross capacity added -have construction times less than 84 months (7 years), which only a third of all US reactors achieved.…”