A ranking for the nodes of directed graphs based on game theory (Poster Presentation)

Ramon, Rafael Amer; Giménez, José Miguel; Magaña, Antonio

doi:10.1002/pamm.200700963

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 4 publications

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“…One of the interesting applications of those two extensions is the recent body of literature that uses game theoretic solution concepts to compute centralities of nodes in networks [del Pozo et al 2011;Amer et al 2007Amer et al , 2010. In summary, by defining a coalitional game with players being nodes of a network, and then computing a solution for such a game, it is possible to obtain a measure of importance for individual nodes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games

Michalak

Szczepański

Rahwan³

et al. 2014

ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

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Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This class of games is a useful abstraction for a number of realistic settings and economic situations, such as modeling relationships in social networks. To date, two main extensions of the Shapley value have been proposed for generalized characteristic function games: the Nowak-Radzik [1994] value and the Sánchez-Bergantiños [1997] value. In this context, the present article studies generalized characteristic function games from the point of view of implementation and computation. Specifically, the article makes two key contributions. First, building upon the mechanism by Dasgupta and Chiu [1998], we present a non-cooperative mechanism that implements both the Nowak-Radzik value and the Sánchez-Bergantiños value in Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in expectations. Second, in order to facilitate an efficient computation supporting the implementation mechanism, we propose the Generalized MarginalContribution Nets representation for this type of game. This representation extends the results of Ieong and Shoham [2006] and Elkind et al. [2009] for characteristic function games and retains their attractive computational properties.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%