A Pyrrhic Victory: Harold Wilson, Helmut Schmidt, and the British Renegotiation of EC Membership, 1974–5

Abstract

Britain's renegotiation of EC membership in 1974-5 has commonly been praised by historians as a tactical masterpiece by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in holding a divided country and party together while also keeping Britain inside the European Community. By contrast, this article focuses on the detrimental effect the episode had on Britain's standing inside the EC. Using the prism of high-level diplomacy between Wilson and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, it reconstructs precisely the changes in German perceptions of British positions, showing how initial goodwill towards Britain's demands soon gave way to widespread scepticism over British motives and ultimate intentions. While highlighting the strong domestic pressures driving Britain and Germany apart, the article ultimately argues that these differences were unnecessarily exacerbated by Wilson's failure at personal diplomacy on the highest level. A different handling of Schmidt may not have resulted in a radically different outcome of the renegotiations; but it may well have avoided the profound sense of distrust and suspicion over Britain's future role in Europe that the episode stimulated among the Germans. The article is based on recently declassified sources from three countries, as well as on rare materials from Schmidt's private archive in Hamburg.

Las raíces del 'Brexit': institucionalización del euroescepticismo

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Adjusting an institutional framework to a globalising world: the creation of new institutions in the EEC, 1957-1992

“…The European Council immediately became de facto a crisis management institution, although it was formally recognised as an institution in the EU legal framework only with the Lisbon Treaty. As early as in 1975, the European Council dealt with the UK government's first threat to leave the EEC in order to renegotiate the terms of its membership (Haeussler 2015), and then with subsequent discussions about the UK's contribution to the EU budget. The European Council offered a forum where EEC heads of governments could discuss the most pressing issues of the time, such as high inflation, the energy crisis, and the rise of unemployment.…”

The contested nature of political leadership in the European Union: conceptual and methodological cross-fertilisation

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