A PUF- and Biometric-Based Lightweight Hardware Solution to Increase Security at Sensor Nodes

Abstract

Security is essential in sensor nodes which acquire and transmit sensitive data. However, the constraints of processing, memory and power consumption are very high in these nodes. Cryptographic algorithms based on symmetric key are very suitable for them. The drawback is that secure storage of secret keys is required. In this work, a low-cost solution is presented to obfuscate secret keys with Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which exploit the hardware identity of the node. In addition, a lightweight fingerprint recognition solution is proposed, which can be implemented in low-cost sensor nodes. Since biometric data of individuals are sensitive, they are also obfuscated with PUFs. Both solutions allow authenticating the origin of the sensed data with a proposed dual-factor authentication protocol. One factor is the unique physical identity of the trusted sensor node that measures them. The other factor is the physical presence of the legitimate individual in charge of authorizing their transmission. Experimental results are included to prove how the proposed PUF-based solution can be implemented with the SRAMs of commercial Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) chips which belong to the communication module of the sensor node. Implementation results show how the proposed fingerprint recognition based on the novel texture-based feature named QFingerMap16 (QFM) can be implemented fully inside a low-cost sensor node. Robustness, security and privacy issues at the proposed sensor nodes are discussed and analyzed with experimental results from PUFs and fingerprints taken from public and standard databases.

Trusted Cameras on Mobile Devices Based on SRAM Physically Unclonable Functions

“…Manufacturing process variations are unique of each SRAM, unpredictable, and difficult to be cloned physically or modeled mathematically. Hence, the bit strings composed of SRAM start-up values meet the requirements of PUF responses [ 28 , 33 , 34 , 35 ].…”

Cork as a Unique Object: Device, Method, and Evaluation

“…Since the appearance of the PUFs in 2001, several object types were proposed as candidates to PUF systems, such as Optical PUFs [19,20], Image-based PUFs [21,22], Coating PUFs [23,24], Silicon PUFs [25], SRAM (Static Random Access Memory) PUFs [26][27][28][29], Paper PUFs [8,30], Arbiter PUFs [31], Reconfigurable PUFs [32], Ring Oscillator Pufs [33,34], RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) PUFs [35], among others. This work focuses on image-based PUFs because as the authors are interested in its scope.…”

Design and implementation of enhanced lightweight memory-based and monostable physical unclonable functions

“…Besides, the protection is only as strong as its weakest link, once the key is hacked, the last line of defence is torn down. Due to the ease of access of most IoT devices, storing the key in non-volatile storage has proven to be vulnerable to various forms of non-invasive, semi-invasive and invasive attacks [3] [60]. In this light, silicon PUF emerges as a burgeoning technology for IoT security.…”

“…With unclonability arises from the hardness of reproducing the multitude of uncontrollable manufacturing process parameters, PUF is touted as a promising new technology for building hardware root of trust with lightweight crypto for robust authentication between devices, and establish trust for data being read or written into an IoT endpoint without the need for stored keys, expensive secure memory and anti-tamper technologies. Over years, a vast multifarious of PUFs have been developed [57]- [60]. Some of which have been successfully commercialized, notably for generating the essential part of a self-sovereign identity, the private key, in a tamper-proof manner.…”

“…It turns out that the use of real identity like fingerprint or facial features as self-sovereign identity cannot be easily replaced once they are compromised. Alternative biometric solutions [60], [61] that intertwine PUF as the fingerprint of the hardware owned by the user with his traditional biometrics catalyse completely new ways of attestation for human-machine interactions. Although the advent of PUF has broadened the scope of possible applications beyond simple device identification and authentication, weak PUFs such as memory PUFs [17], [58] and the multi-port memory PUF presented in the previous chapter, despite the extended entropy of multiple response bits per cell, are still very much constrained by the possibility of exhaustive read out due to its limited number of CRPs.…”