A Public Health Perspective on the U.S. Response to the Fukushima Radiological Emergency

Abstract

On 11 March 2011, northern Japan was struck by first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the eastern coast and then by an ensuing tsunami. At the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), these twin disasters initiated a cascade of events that led to radionuclide releases. Radioactive material from Japan was subsequently transported to locations around the globe, including the U.S. The levels of radioactive material that arrived in the U.S. were never large enough to cause health effects, but the presence of this material in the environment was enough to require a response from the public health community. Events during the response illustrated some U.S. preparedness challenges that previously had been anticipated and others that were newly identified. Some of these challenges include the following: (1) Capacity, including radiation health experts, for monitoring potentially exposed people for radioactive contamination are limited and may not be adequate at the time of a large-scale radiological incident; (2) there is no public health authority to detain people contaminated with radioactive materials; (3) public health and medical capacities for response to radiation emergencies are limited; (4) public health communications regarding radiation emergencies can be improved to enhance public health response; (5) national and international exposure standards for radiation measurements (and units) and protective action guides lack uniformity; (6) access to radiation emergency monitoring data can be limited; and (7) the Strategic National Stockpile may not be currently prepared to meet the public health need for KI in the case of a surge in demand from a large-scale radiation emergency. Members of the public health community can draw on this experience to improve public health preparedness.

From early prophylaxis to delayed treatment: Establishing the plutonium decorporation activity window of hydroxypyridinonate chelating agents

“…From generating electricity to being misused as components in radiation dispersal devices or “dirty bombs,” radiological materials serve purposes that range from the benevolent to the malevolent and impact not only local nuclear power users, but also those halfway around the world [1]. Whether natural or manmade, accidental or deliberate, the possibility of radiological incidents from laboratories, industry, or terrorism that lead to the uncontrolled dissemination of radioactive contaminants highlights the importance of developing effective decorporation therapies as medical countermeasures [2].…”

Pharmacological management of ionizing radiation injuries: current and prospective agents and targeted organ systems

“…In addition, it is effective only against internal contamination with 131 I. KI neither protects against any other radionuclide nor prevents or limits the uptake of 131 I into other organs [186]. Since KI is easily available to all individuals, the stockpiling of KI in the strategic national stockpile (SNS) was discontinued briefly, but again stockpiled as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi incidence and pediatric concerns [187].…”

A review of radiation countermeasures focusing on injury-specific medicinals and regulatory approval status: part II. Countermeasures for limited indications, internalized radionuclides, emesis, late effects, and agents demonstrating efficacy in large animals with or without FDA IND status

“…Furthermore, of that 131 I which is produced, approximately 10% will reach the earth's surface as most will decay to stable xenon-131, thus limiting potential and sizable exposures to radioactive iodine following a nuclear detonation. Accordingly, and due to KI being readily available to the general public, the stockpiling of KI in the SNS was discontinued briefly, but only to be restarted as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi incident and associated pediatric concerns (Whitcomb et al 2015).…”