2017
DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12435
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A Psychological Firewall? Risk Perceptions and Public Support for Online Censorship in Russia*

Abstract: Objective Authoritarian regimes commonly justify Internet censorship by framing the Internet as a threat to their citizens that must be tightly controlled for their own protection. This threat rhetoric underpins government censorship and creates a “psychological firewall” driving public support for a censored Internet. Methods Based on risk and decision‐making scholarship, we evaluate how mass media and partisan regime support promulgate these threat perceptions, and in turn how they influence citizen attitude… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 64 publications
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“…These patterns are also consistent with, and further extend, some prior studies from nondemocratic countries. For instance, in the Arab world, some evidence shows that Islamic identity shapes exposure and reactions to news sources for Arab audiences (Bou-Hamad and Yehya 2016; Golan and Kiousis 2010; Nisbet, Saldana et al 2017), and in Russia both general support for the regime (system justification) and Russian nationalism (hegemonic identity) influence how Russians process information and view state censorship (Nisbet, Kamenchuk, and Dal 2017; Stoycheff and Nisbet 2017). In short, a confluence of context- and regime-specific factors drive individual media use.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These patterns are also consistent with, and further extend, some prior studies from nondemocratic countries. For instance, in the Arab world, some evidence shows that Islamic identity shapes exposure and reactions to news sources for Arab audiences (Bou-Hamad and Yehya 2016; Golan and Kiousis 2010; Nisbet, Saldana et al 2017), and in Russia both general support for the regime (system justification) and Russian nationalism (hegemonic identity) influence how Russians process information and view state censorship (Nisbet, Kamenchuk, and Dal 2017; Stoycheff and Nisbet 2017). In short, a confluence of context- and regime-specific factors drive individual media use.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Their political systems have adopted different internet restrictions, which directly affect citizens’ abilities to gain access to political information and perceptions about internet freedom. Russia seeks to maintain and extend its influence through extensive online censorship and monitoring procedures, which it justifies as necessary for public security (Nisbet et al 2017), whereas the United States advocates for an open internet but contradicts this position with problematic surveillance and widespread data collection (Couldry 2017; Keller 2017).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They advance a many-internets approach, which aspires to grant each country sovereignty over internet flow within its borders. Thus far, proponents of many-internets are among the world’s most despotic, embracing extraordinary measures that restrict and monitor online content (Nisbet et al 2017). For example, Russia recently adopted a law that seeks to mandate internet service providers use only servers inside the country, allowing it to entirely disconnect from external—and democratic—forces (Jee 2019).…”
Section: Perceived Internet Interferencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This approach centers on the social-psychology of citizens' decision-making in these authoritarian contexts where the public's subjective perceptions are more predictive of online behavior than expert "objective" assessments (e.g., ratings from international organizations). We build on recent scholarship on the psychology of repression on how fear shapes citizens' perceptions about and engagement in anti-government political participation (Aldama et al, 2019;Young, 2019), and how perceptions about how much freedom citizens enjoy, rather than reality, influence online political behavior in authoritarian contexts (e.g., Behrouzian et al, 2016;Nisbet et al, 2017;Nisbet & Stoycheff, 2013;Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014).…”
Section: Cost and Risk As Non-equivalent Concepts: The Case Of Networked Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, authoritarian regimes focus on curtailing political mobilization, suppressing political opposition, and promoting a passive citizenry by definition (Linz, 2000). As a consequence, political communication environments focus on disseminating the regime's repressive discourse highlighting the potential risks of expressive behavior (e.g., Nisbet et al, 2017). Accordingly, the academic scholarship falls short of adequately explaining the experience in authoritarian contexts given the lack of an emphasis on the distinction between what is required prior to (i.e., cost) versus what may happen after engaging in OPE (i.e., risk) from a citizen viewpoint.…”
Section: Cost and Risk As Non-equivalent Concepts: The Case Of Networked Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%