A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism

Brosnan, Sarah F.; Waal, Frans B. M. de

doi:10.1007/s12110-002-1017-2

Cited by 293 publications

(229 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…Virtually all organisms exhibit social behaviors that are flexible or conditional on the behaviors of others, from bacteria (e.g., quorum sensing; Miller and Bassler 2001) to insects (e.g., reproductive strategies depending on social context; WestEberhard 1987), birds (e.g., responses of parents to each other; Wright and Cuthill 1989), primates (e.g., reciprocal altruism; Brosnan and de Waal 2002), and obviously, humans. Not surprisingly, a large theoretical literature focuses on the evolutionary consequences of particular kinds of flexible (or conditional) behavior (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton 1981;McNamara et al 1999; Lehmann and Keller 2006;Akçay et al 2009;Boyd et al 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Akçay

Cleve

2012

The American Naturalist

185

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An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other's actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral responses and in facilitating evolutionary transitions in individuality. Disciplines Behavior and Ethology | Biology | Population Biology CommentsAt the time of publication, author Erol Akçay was affiliated with the University of Tennessee. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Department of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania. Online enhancement: appendix.abstract: An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other's actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral respons...

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Akçay

Cleve

2012

The American Naturalist

185

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“…Consider Smith's (1776Smith's ( /2007) famous invisible hand, in which every individual acting for his own good produces-as unintended by-products-benefits for others. Psychologists, as well, often regard helpful acts as being selfishly motivated, whether to consciously achieve material outcomes as in 'calculated reciprocity' (Brosnan & de Waal 2002), or unconsciously as a means to achieve psychological benefits such as the 'warm glow' that comes from helping (Andreoni 1990). Concern for the well-being of others is not necessary for prosocial behaviour (though Smith did pay special attention to these moral emotions ;Smith 1759Smith /2005.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation

Jensen

2010

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

170

167

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Causing harm to others would hardly seem to be relevant to cooperation, other than as a barrier to it. However, because selfish individuals will exploit cooperators, functional punishment is an effective mechanism for enforcing cooperation by deterring free-riding. Although functional punishment can shape the social behaviour of others by targeting non-cooperative behaviour, it can also intimidate others into doing almost anything. Second-party functional punishment is a self-serving behaviour at the disposal of dominant individuals who can coerce others into behaving cooperatively, but it need not do so. Third-party and altruistic functional punishment are less likely to be selfishly motivated and would seem more likely to maintain norms of cooperation in large groups. These forms of functional punishment may be an essential part of non-kin cooperation on a scale exhibited only by humans. While punitive sentiments might be the psychological force behind punitive behaviours, spiteful motives might also play an important role. Furthermore, functionally spiteful acts might not be maladaptive; reckoning gains relative to others rather than in absolute terms can lead to hyper-competitiveness, which might also be an important part of human cooperation, rather than just an ugly by-product.

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“…For instance, males may groom females to increase their chances of mating, or they may share meat according to the amount of help provided in hunting the prey (de Waal, 1989;Mitani & Watts, 2001), which would be in line with the reciprocal altruism hypothesis as originally formulated by Trivers (1971). Although some authors have maintained that chimpanzees keep a record of social credits and debits (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002), others argue that the correlations observed in the reciprocity of the positive behavior are not sufficient to draw conclusions about the calculation that would underlie this reciprocity (Hemelrijk, 1996).…”

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confidence: 97%

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) anticipation of food return: Coping with waiting time in an exchange task.

Dufour¹,

Péle²,

Sterck³

et al. 2007

Journal of Comparative Psychology

126

116

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Despite controversial expectations that animals achieve reciprocal altruism, it is unclear if nonhuman species possess the necessary cognitive abilities. For reciprocal altruism, individuals must anticipate the loss of a commodity and accept a delay before some return. The authors investigated the abilities of 5 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to cope with increasing waiting duration in exchange tasks. Subjects had to keep a small cookie before returning it to a human partner to obtain a larger piece. For a piece 2, 4, or 8 times the size of the small piece, 3 of the 5 subjects waited for up to 4 min. For a piece 40 times larger, 4 of the 5 subjects waited up to 8 min. At long time lag, renouncement to wait occurred earlier than predicted by subjects' general waiting capacity, suggesting that the decision to wait was based on a trade-off between reward quantity and expected costs of the waiting duration. Chimpanzees could anticipate a delayed reward at a time scale of several minutes. If this reflects a cognitive limit in chimpanzees' anticipation capacity, reciprocal altruism by keeping track of costs and benefits over extended periods may be unlikely in chimpanzees.

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A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism

Cited by 293 publications

References 49 publications

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) anticipation of food return: Coping with waiting time in an exchange task.

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