A prototype security hardened field device for SCADA systems.

Role based access control and authentication for SCADA field devices using a dual Bloom filter and challenge-response.

“…However to prevent this from being a security issue only one cell can have write access to any given register. Cells can however share read access to a register [20]. All memory operations including access to hardware registers are performed using a virtual memory system…”

“…This technique of splitting a large hash function into smaller hash functions was also used by Tripunitara and Carbunar [16]. In order to ensure correctness are reduce coding time an open source c implementation of SHA-256 created by Aaron Gifford [28] and modified by Brad Luyster [20] for compatibility with OKL4 was used to generate the SHA-256 hashes required by the FD-SPP.…”

“…It expands upon previously developed technologies developed at the University of Louisville for hardening legacy remote terminal units against cyber-attacks for HIHS [1], [4], [20]. The device will act as an add-on to existing legacy remote Traditional industrial control systems or SCADA systems, do not provide any authentication or authorization [5], the FD-SPP will add these features to existing control systems.…”

“…All IPC communication channels must be defined at compile time and cannot be changed during run time. This means that if there are no IPC communications channels defined between to cells they cannot directly communicate [20]. Shown below is the layout of the three cells as was shown previously, however now the threads and IPC calls of the system have been added.…”