A prolegomenon to the empirical cross‐linguistic study of truth

Abstract

In this paper, we propose and justify the cross-linguistic study of the concept of truth through empirical studies of truth predicates, with results of such studies. We first conceptually explore the possibility of cross-linguistic disagreement about truth purely due to linguistic norms governing truth predicates, which may imply a kind of pluralism about the concept of truth. We then consider the conditions under which we would be justified in inferring this sort of pluralism from the fact of such cross-linguistic disagreement. Next, we report results of three studies on the use of English "is true" and Japanese two truth predicates, as well as "is correct" and its Japanese counterpart. We then report another set of studies using a different vignette, where the radical cross-linguistic difference observed in earlier studies disappeared. These data together suggest that the moral-political factor in the truth-bearer (utterance) strongly affects the uses of Japanese truth predicates but not those of English. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the studies and results reported here, and the empirical possibility of what we call lexical alethic pluralism, for debates over relativism, theories of meaning, and the deflationary and inflationary theories of truth.